

EAST EUROPE

A Monthly Review of East European Affairs

Petru Dumitriu

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Elizabeth Marbury Bass

ULBRICHT'S ECONOMY

NOTES ON THE POLISH PRESS

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HOW THEY CHOSE BYCEK

PICTURES FROM
BERLIN





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EAST EUROPE

A MONTHLY REVIEW OF EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

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EAST EUROPE is a journal of information and discussion devoted to political, economic, social and intellectual trends in the Communist-governed countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Unsigned articles are written by the staff, based on the analysis of specialists from East European countries. The views expressed by outside contributors are not necessarily those of the Free Europe Committee. Manuscripts and letters should be addressed to East Europe, 2 Park Avenue, N. Y., 16.

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THE MONTH IN REVIEW

THE DRAFT PROGRAM

"A GREAT PURIFYING STORM is passing over the world, betokening the spring of mankind. . . . One-third of mankind is building a new life under the banner of scientific communism. . . . The world of socialism is expanding, and the world of capitalism is contracting. Socialism will inevitably replace capitalism everywhere; such is the objective law of social development."

These sentences are taken from the introduction to the Draft Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was published to the world on July 30. Barely two weeks later the apostles of this dispensation had to explain to the world why they had forbidden people to cross from East Berlin to West Berlin, and why it had been necessary to enforce the order with barbed wire, tanks and water cannon. "These measures," said Radio Moscow, "have been taken with the object of protecting the working people of the German Democratic Republic from the hostile activity of the revenge-seeking and militaristic forces of West Germany and West Berlin. The working people of the republic have acclaimed the government's decree."

The whole 44-year history of Communist power might be written in terms of the opposition between its manifestoes and its practices. The manifestoes seem to appeal mainly to people over whom the "great purifying storm" has not yet passed, while those who have had to live with it tend to be unbelievers. A writer who took the Berlin exit last year, leaving a comfortable life in Romania to try his chances in the West, argues elsewhere in this issue that people who have been exposed to modern industrial civilization are inclined to be skeptical of the Marxist-Leninist dogma, and that what attraction it still retains within the Communist world is mainly for those masses in Russia and China who have not yet entered the twentieth century. While it would be difficult to say just what a Russian peasant thinks of Khrushchev's ideology, there is no question that the language of the Draft Program was meant to appeal to his ears.

DEFINES THE DOCTRINE

THE DRAFT PROGRAM contains more, however, than propaganda for Russian peasants. Among other things, it is a statement of doctrine that is binding upon Communists not only in the Soviet Union but everywhere in the world. *Pravda*, on August 6, called it a "great political and theoretical document of our era." In Prague, the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party issued a formal declaration calling it "one of the basic documents of the international working class, a historic turning point in its revolutionary course and in its successful struggle for communism." The Czechoslovak Central Committee called upon all working people, Communists in particular, to read the document carefully and use it "in all sectors of our life in the interests of further organizational, production, scientific and ideological work, and for the development of consciousness, education and culture." The other Parties of the Soviet bloc issued similar declarations, and there were statements of fealty from Communist Parties in all corners of the globe.

People who live outside the Soviet bloc will find certain statements in the document of particular interest. In the first part, which deals with the significance of the Soviet example for other countries, the messianic, imperialistic character of the Russian system is defined for all to read. The first premise is that "in all countries, irrespective



of the level of their economic development, territorial size, and population, true progress is feasible only under socialism." This is dogmatic enough, but it is only the beginning. The second premise runs: "The experience of the USSR has shown that people can achieve socialism only as the result of socialist revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat." A few paragraphs farther on is the sentence: "The experience of the USSR has fully confirmed the Marxist-Leninist teaching about the decisive role of the Communist Party in the formation and development of socialist society." And finally comes the unabashed statement that, in the USSR, "mankind has been given a socialist society that is a reality, and a science for the building of socialism which has been tested in practice. The high road to socialism has been paved. It is now being taken by many peoples, and sooner or later all the peoples will walk it."

SETS
THE
PATTERN
FOR
ALL

THESE WORDS are not careless rhetoric. They were produced by the Party secretariat in Moscow, working in comfortable offices supplied with stenographers, filing cabinets and dictionaries. It is not the first Program in the history of the CPSU but the third, and it incorporates the substance of other ideological documents such as last summer's Bucharest Declaration and last fall's Declaration of the Leaders of Eighty-One Communist Parties in Moscow. The program is a model of clarity and elegance by the standards of Communist political writing. One must suppose that it means exactly what it says.

It means not only that all true Communists must obey Moscow, but that they are duty-bound to copy its institutions as well. "The world system of socialism is a new type of economic and political relationship between countries. The socialist countries have a uniform state structure . . . the same ideology . . . common interests in the protection of revolutionary conquests . . . and a single great goal—communism." They must also follow uniform policies and avoid catering too much to the national prejudices of their fellow countrymen. "The path of building socialism in isolation, detached from the world commonwealth of socialist countries, is as theoretically invalid as it is contrary to the objective laws of the development of socialist society. . . . Nationalism is the fundamental political and ideological weapon which is used by international reaction and by remnants of internal reactionary forces against the unity of socialist countries."

OPPOSES
SELF-
DETERMINATION

IT IS NOT enough for a political party to call itself Communist, for not everyone who cries "Lord, Lord" shall enter the gates of paradise. Tito's followers are specifically excluded. "Under contemporary conditions the main danger in the Communist movement is revisionism, rightwing opportunism, which is a reflection of bourgeois influence. . . . The revisionists deny the historical necessity of the socialist revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party, thus undermining the foundations of proletarian internationalism and sliding into nationalism. The ideology of revisionism is most fully embodied in the program of the League of Yugoslav Communists."

But the Yugoslavs, well sheltered behind their Balkan defenses and enjoying good relations with the rest of the world, are no longer much concerned at Moscow's disapproval. Belgrade responded by saying that the CPSU Program did not exhaust the meaning of socialism, and *Borba* filled its pages the next day with a discussion of the impending draft of the new Yugoslav Constitution.

Isaac Deutscher recently pointed out in the London *Observer* that when Lenin introduced the previous Party Program back in 1919, there was open controversy over some of its tenets. The discussion centered on the right of every nation to self-determination. Answering some of his critics, Lenin said: "The past has its hold on us and grips us with thousands of hands. . . . We must live side by side with those nations, the Germans, the Poles, the Finns. Already some people are saying of us that we want to conquer Germany. . . . We must conduct our affairs in such a way that no one shall be able to say that the Bolsheviks are imposing their system and that they want to carry it to Berlin on their bayonets." That controversy is not likely to be repeated this time.

The Two New Classes

by

PETRU DUMITRIU

A former Communist official, who escaped from Romania in 1960, describes the society the Communists are building. He maintains, like the Yugoslav writer Milovan Djilas, that the new society cannot be understood in terms of the ideology its leaders profess. "The trend of development," he writes, "leads toward an ever wider diffusion of Western intellectual attitudes. The only allies of the official doctrine are the most backward Russian masses."

HISTORY WILL perhaps one day show the Communist regimes of our day to have been merely the means by which the industrial revolution was carried out in certain backward agrarian countries. The task of industrialization is undertaken by a "new class"—as described by Milovan Djilas—and this class constitutes itself in the process of industrialization, identifying itself with it. But what else happens during this revolutionary process—apart from the emergence of this new ruling class?

Perhaps the most important event, socially and politically, is the emergence of a second new class, a new middle class. Both these new groups are very different from their counterparts in other societies. Their formation is today far advanced in the Soviet Union, only incipient in China, and in several intermediate stages in the other Communist countries.

My knowledge of these two classes is based upon the experience of Romania, a country in which the formation of the new society is relatively retarded. However it is impossible to describe the great trends at work in Eastern Europe without a brief discussion of the cultural milieu into which they were introduced, nor without reference to the Soviet precedent. It must be borne in mind that in 1945 industrialization was already underway in all of Eastern Europe save for Albania and perhaps Yugoslavia, and Soviet military and political power imposed upon the area, not industrialization itself, but a *particular form* of indus-

trialization accompanied by techniques of government and a social pattern peculiar to Russia.

I must begin by insisting—contrary to Djilas—that the new class did not leap fully armed, like Athena from her father's head, out of the Leninist concepts held by a small sect of professional revolutionaries. The notion of the state's pre-eminent ownership of the land, the tradition of state bureaucracy as an absolute and irresponsible power above, and eventually opposed to, the ruled, are very old in both Russia and China.

As for Romania, the Byzantine tradition persisted there while Turkish rule was uprooting Byzantine ways elsewhere in the Balkans, and Romanian modernization and liberalization in the 19th century left intact a part of the old national habit, Byzantine in origin, of political absolutism and bureaucracy. Thus among Romanians the state remained much more the almighty master than it was for the South Slavs, or for the Poles, Hungarians and Czechs—who experienced Western feudalism and a subsequent development along West European lines. To the Romanian, the idea of a civil servant remained as strange as to the Russian. The functionary in Romania has always been an exacting and arbitrary master, never a servant. And still more is this the case in Russian tradition.

Djilas, then, seems wrong in believing that the new class was "created" by modern events. It was not. The old Tsarist bureaucracy may have been expelled physically by

Russia's revolutionaries, but bureaucracy as a social and collective technique for mastering national problems lived on—in the minds of the people, in their habits, their patterns of thought, their aptitude for certain political relationships and their reluctance to make use of other relationships which, abstractly speaking, would have been quite as feasible and rather more efficient than those in fact employed.

The Party machine, however, was an original invention which made use of the bureaucratic tradition and of such seemingly forgotten Russian political devices as Ivan the Terrible's *oprichnina* to create something truly new. But the raw material of traditional notions, of emotional and behavioral patterns, even of existing administrative machinery, was there. Djila's new class did not happen *ex nihilo*: rather it was like the sudden crystallization of a saturated solution.

The Role of Doctrine

IT ALSO must be emphasized in defining the new ruling class that it arose in backward, agrarian, bureaucratic, and in Russia's case, theocratic, empires. Metaphysics, a dogmatic and static view of the universe, conservative beliefs—a faith in the once-given revelation of ultimate truths—are all characteristic of such societies. In Russia, this national consciousness was also affected by rural and characteristically peasant messianic and eschatological notions. I would argue that all these elements are present in the thinking of the new ruling class.

Let me attempt to distinguish these qualities as they exist today—leaving aside the dynamics of original Marxism, of which only the wording remains.

The teaching is regarded as once-given. Critical examina-

tion of the teaching, called revisionism, is the deadliest sin. The image of the universe is nominally dynamic, but the image itself is not allowed to change. Changes in the real world are inadmissible except for those "foreseen" by the doctrine. So, through a mental trick, change itself is frozen into a given and unchanging pattern—or in other words, is suppressed. The old joke about Soviet historiography—"in the Soviet Union the future is well known; it is only the past that is subject to change"—identifies exactly this intellectual disposition.

On messianism and eschatological beliefs I need hardly insist. The fact that the Slavophiles and most other Russian thinkers of the past and present centuries expressed the same kind of feelings of national message and ordained destiny as the Russian Marxists might indicate a national messianism, and this is in great part true. But China's contemporary messianism, which prompts the Chinese Communists, even if only darkly, to emphasize *their* message as superior to that of Moscow, would seem to indicate a messianic trend in all agrarian societies. The more so as still other messianisms seem to be burgeoning or reviving in other non-industrialized societies.

The intellectual life of so modest a country as Romania included messianic assertions in the years between the two world wars. Our small agrarian nation was proclaimed by some thinkers, who grouped themselves around the magazine *Gândirea*, as the *theophorous*, or God-bearing, nation. It seems that we find ourselves in the presence of a mode of thinking related to a certain stage in social and economic development. The dogmatism and irrationalism of the strict Leninist-Stalinist faith appear as products of that same non-industrialized society which produced the revolutionaries themselves, the revolutions, and the new class.



PETRU DUMITRU was born in Bazias, Romania, in 1924. He published "socialist-realist" short stories and novels, receiving the State Prize for Literature three times. In 1953 he was made editor-in-chief of the largest Romanian literary magazine, VIATZA ROMANEASCA; in 1956 Director of the State Publishing House for Literature and Art; and in 1958 Chairman of the Publishing Council of the Ministry of Culture. While on an excursion in 1960 he escaped to West Berlin, and is now living in Western Europe. His last novel published in Romania was THE BOYARS (Family Jewels); it will appear in the United States in October.

He writes: "The observations in this article were made before my escape, in an effort to render clear to myself what was happening around me, sine ira et studio, although I consider the Communist system backward and barbaric, tempting to the emerging young power elites of backward countries but tragically unsatisfactory as compared with Western civilization."

It is worth remarking that the intellectual approach of the new class to economic and technological problems is of the same irrational and authoritarian kind: otherwise the industrial, technical, organizational and economic absurdities which abound in all Communist states could hardly be explained. The typical member of the new ruling class is intellectually a stranger to that rational, utilitarian thought which produces industrialism. Faith has little to do with the workings, and still less with the invention, of machines. The critical and experimental spirit, rejecting all that is unworkable or impractical, is foreign to the orthodox Marxist-Leninists of the Communist countries. When applied to the articles of their faith, it is damned as revisionism, and even when reality itself compels changes in the doctrine—as it often has since Lenin, and still more often since Marx and Engels—the changes are proclaimed as actually conforming to the original revelation.

The reason may be that orthodoxy is a powerful emotional need of peasant masses, and of the rulers so long as they are a political expression of those masses. Russian messianism, together with Russian patriotism and even jingoism, is the most powerful psychological link between the rural half of the nation and the rulers. Nor should we forget that Russia's urban population is in greater part of rural origin and rural mentality. More than one generation is required to make of a peasant an industrial worker, a creative designer of machines, or a scientific researcher—even if allowance is made for the great gifts of the Russian nation and for the incidence of remarkable individuals in any large human group.

The Two Classes Defined

THE CONSCIOUS (or unconscious) practical purpose of the new ruling class is to industrialize their countries. This is a commonplace; and equally well known are the ruthless methods applied to achieve this goal. (But again the methods have precedents in Russian, Chinese and Mongolian tradition.) However the economic substructure the new class required was not built by them. Again I feel compelled to disagree with Djilas' otherwise brilliant and accurate analysis. The economic substructure already existed in Russia and Eastern Europe—and in China. Thus the new ruling class was not created and conditioned by the forces of industrialization. It was created and conditioned by the impact of Western civilization and the industrial revolution upon agrarian, absolutist and bureaucratic empires. What is created by the process of industrialization is the new middle class.

The Party machine had been engendered before industrialization had really begun in Russia, and it later was in existence in China long before the "great leap forward." Indeed, the ruling Party bureaucracy is certified in texts written in the early nineteen twenties. By contrast, the new middle class emerged only after the Second World War. I do not mean by this to identify the moment of its formation, but rather to identify the point at which this new middle class made its first political, economic, social and ideological moves.



"Gentlemen, remember—we must not bother with any external frills."
Polityka (Warsaw), January 21, 1961

The process of industrialization consists, socially, in the creation of wide strata of skilled workers, technicians, scientists, professional people, and low level economic managers. These, as distinguished from unskilled farm and factory laborers, make up the new middle class. The lower limits of the class are shifting and uncertain; what is more important is to establish clearly the demarcation line between it and the new ruling class. What is it that they do *not* have in common? There is a trend of development which tends to shift them apart, and eventually to drive them into opposition to one another in a final—although only faintly foreseeable—struggle for power.

We may, to start with, survey some of the offices and professions that belong to one or the other class, and then proceed to an analysis of the characteristics distinguishing the two classes. It is, for one thing, a mistake to include intellectuals in the new class. Only those heads of organizations (the Academy, the professional unions) who do the political work of control and surveillance of their colleagues belong to the new ruling class. A major part—perhaps half—of the membership of the National Assemblies and the Supreme Soviet are distinguished middle class people put into office to provide the appearance of national solidarity with Party policy. The Army is middle class except for political officers. On the other hand, the Security forces are identified with the oligarchy's rule down as far into the ranks as the non-commissioned officers—indeed, to the point that if the regime fails they face massacre, as happened in Hungary. Among scientific, teaching and publishing personnel, those who are involved with the propagation of

Marxism-Leninism stand and fall with the ruling class. The same is true of all those concerned with foreign cultural and economic relations. In the pyramid of state administration, the general directors in ministries are on the lower edge of the upper class, but the least Party *apparatchik* fully "belongs." The manager of a great factory "belongs" as soon as the actual technical management of the concern is taken over by a subordinate and the manager assumes political supervision. Managers of lesser units, the heads of state farms, collective farms and small factories, are, on the contrary, the backbone of the new middle class, together with skilled workers and technicians, scientists, artists and writers.

To recognize a member of the new upper class, as distinct from one of the new middle class, at least four criteria should be consulted, none of which seems to me sufficient if taken alone. These four are the individual's ideological outlook, his attitude toward the industrialization program, his possession or lack of authority to command, and finally his participation in privilege. A fifth criterion, his adherence to the political program, is more complicated according to whether the individual is a citizen of an independent country or of a satellite, and whether the political program is foreign or domestic.

Faith and Pragmatism

UNQUALIFIED FAITH in the doctrine, as it is proclaimed at the highest Party level (in Moscow for the Soviet zone of domination, in Peiping for the Chinese sphere, and in Belgrade for the Yugoslavs), is a mark of the upper class—but not only of it: enormous numbers of people who have attended Soviet schools believe in the history, geography, sociology and philosophy taught there. Believers in the Russian-fashioned Marxist interpretation of the world are much less numerous in a nation such as Romania or the other satellite countries. But even in Romania, even among

skeptics, even among people educated enough to know better, if they are members of the ruling class, the Muscovite orthodoxy is a matter of vital concern. The orthodoxy is much less an item of conviction or belief than it is an emotional rallying point for people who share the same privilege, the same power, the same dangers from enemies both domestic and external. It is no intellectual pursuit: it is a battle standard. In the later years of Stalin's tyranny, his "cult" had much the same socio-emotional function. Those who lamented his death and those who rejoiced in it were already two distinct classes. Even in Romania, where Stalin's person, as such, could mean little, he was nonetheless a symbol, the idol of a certain tribe—of Djilas' new class.

The new middle class, on the other hand, is influenced by its historical formation, and by its economic and social status and function, in the direction of revisionism. Revisionism, taken in the deepest meaning given this word by a Stalinist, or for that matter by a revisionist, is the adaptation to existing facts of man's intellectual and practical approach to the world. Instead of trying to mold reality according to a mental image of Utopia, the revisionist wants to change the mental image, and thus Utopia, to comply with existing facts.

It is an unmetaphysical, scientific, pragmatic approach, whose deep intellectual and emotional difference from orthodoxy cannot be overstated. Nor can the gravity of the implications of this difference be overestimated. The whole history of Russia, and a great part of the history of the Romanian peasantry, is distinguished by orthodoxy. The whole history of the Western world points towards revisionism. It is no accident that revisionism openly occurred in those satellite countries which are part of Europe proper, and whose cultural development was European: Poland and Hungary. Romania, involved in the Byzantine heritage until 1800, has made no contribution to the revisionist movement. It may be argued that revisionism appeared first in Yugoslavia, also a part of the Byzantine, Greek Orthodox tradition, but this, I think, is an error. Yugoslav Marxism claims for itself the authority of orthodoxy. Real revisionism is not a choice between various centers of orthodoxy; it is rather a choice of the individual conscience over dogma.

Thus we understand that revisionism is easily linked by its opponents to the hated Western world. In still-messianic (because still-peasant) Russia, as in China, revisionism, indeed rationalism—the pragmatic, unmetaphysical approach to problems—smacks of foreignness. In little Romania, the educated think on Western lines; the Party-trained activists on Russian lines. But the nature of modern life—technology, industry, science—constantly wears down the irrationalism and mysticism of the ruling class, so that their language itself sounds, and for that matter, is, unreasonable, even delirious.

In Russia as in all the satellite countries, skepticism, criticism, even a full refutation of orthodoxy, are widespread among students. The ruling class attempts to counter this by recruiting students mostly from the uneducated masses, barring entrance to the sons of educated families. But to no

(Continued on page 30)



A Polish satire: how the bureaucrat is trying to advance his career.
Szpilki (Warsaw), June 18, 1961



V. Jiránek

Dikobraz (Prague), June 16, 1960

How They Chose Bycek

by

Pavel Cerveny

The country needed coal. The mines needed workers. The Party called for volunteers. The author, who left Czechoslovakia not long ago, describes life in "a society where people are forced to lead the lives of children."

THE PLAN for the first quarter had been surpassed. Costs of production had been brought to an all-time low (the slogan had been, "Save, Save, Save—Whatever the Cost"). The season of recruiting for voluntary weekend harvesting brigades was still as far away as the promised wage premiums. A spirit of collective friendliness had descended upon Kablo-Vysocany, and even our Personnel Department's sessions with habitual latecomers took on an air of benevolent conciliation.

But the pace of economic progress could not be permitted to slacken. A snake crept into the little Garden of Eden, and as usual it took the form of a resolution put forth by the Party and Government. As chairman of the plant's Youth League, I first heard of it when I received a phone call from the secretary of the Administrative Deputy Director. The sneer in her voice was a sufficient premonition of impending doom. "Comrade Cerveny, the Administrative Director wishes you to attend a meeting at his office directly after lunch." But the secret was out long before lunch, and the usual gloom and despair had begun to settle onto workshop and

office. The honeymoon was over so suddenly that people felt like howling and baying with dismay—not at the moon but at the Sputnik. It was known that the country's coal production had been lagging behind schedule for some time, and now the Party had decided to increase the number of miners by its favorite method of calling for more "volunteers" from other industries.

When I arrived at the office of the Administrative Deputy Director, I found that the chairman of the plant's Party organization had preceded me. A moment later, the chairman of the trade union organization in the plant came in. The faces of everyone present assumed the determined look that the Party expects from its activists—both in full-face and in profile. The firm hitch of the A. D. D.'s jaw showed that he must have received pretty explicit instructions, and that the plant's wage premiums would depend upon the successful completion of the task.


"Comrades," began the A. D. D. in a voice that implied he was backed by the whole Peace Camp, including 680 million Chinese, "I am sure you have all read the new Party and Government resolution, and that its meaning is clear to you. In order to distribute the new volunteers evenly among the various regions and industries, each region has been given a quota which in turn is divided among the local enterprises. Since Kablo has 230 employees, we must supply four new volunteers for the one-year coal brigades. After terminating this patriotic duty they will, of course, return to their previous positions. The first volunteer is expected at the Kladno coal basin in three weeks, and the other three later in the year. They will receive adequate compensation from the district labor department for the necessary equipment, and I am authorized by the director of our plant to promise them additional aid from our own funds. Our department heads have already received orders to submit a list of persons indispensable for the proper functioning of their departments, and also of those whose health or personal situations will not permit them to leave their domiciles. A list of all the others will be given you later today by my secretary. I suggest that the trade union organization and the Youth League call special committee meetings to discuss the matter. I am sure we'll find enough volunteers in our plant, and I ask your help in choosing the comrades who will have the honor of representing us in the mines. Any questions or suggestions?"

This was followed by the customary harangue of the Party organization chairman on the necessity of private sacrifices for the common good. It was his Speech Number Four, and almost the whole factory could have repeated it by heart, backwards, with every other word left out. "The international tension . . . petty bourgeois mentality . . . new species of socialist man . . . failed to reach goals . . . glorious achievements . . . increased productivity . . . directives and circulars . . . shortage of manpower . . . fuel base . . . socialist heroism . . . fight for peace . . . triumphant struggle . . ." He concluded with a favorite quotation from Khrushchev: "Just as a pig cannot appreciate the glories of heaven, so the capitalists cannot understand the voluntary enthusiasm with which our people make temporary sacrifices for the common good."

When I got back to my office I found my department chief, looking as uncomfortable as a wet chicken, already preparing the required list of people who could not be dispensed with under any circumstances. "Hi Pavel," he called out, "Do you suppose we can argue that our department is so essential that we can claim a 75 percent coefficient of indispensability?"

"Well," I said, "it may interest you to know that the boys spent their lunch hour drawing lots to see what types of sickness are raging among us. The first choice went to coal-dust allergy, and there was a big discussion as to whether they might claim a male version of puerperal fever. I imagine our sickness coefficient will be about 100 percent."

"Oh they'll be in here in no time telling us about their ills. The only thing we can do is to suggest three or four candidates and let it go at that." The department



Dikobraz, November 24, 1960

chief was of middle-class origin, and although he was a Party member his background made him perpetually scared and insecure.

I suggested: "Why don't you include our names along with the others? After all, you can't argue that we're absolutely indispensable, and it would make the boys feel better. We'll have to suggest the meekest of them anyway, or we'll find ourselves wrapped around a lathe in the workshop and our tonsils knocked into the drain. Blessed are the meek, for they shall mine coal."

"But—but—I've got three kids."

"That's all the more reason to volunteer. It will show your profound understanding of our country's needs."

But the chief's mind was already at work building up a second line of defense. "By the way," he said, "I've been thinking we might improve the efficiency of our department by a slight reorganization. Would you mind helping me?"

Secretly, I translated this to mean: "Okay, I'll volunteer, but first I intend to make such a mess of things in this department that nobody would be able to replace me if I should have to go. If you'll help me, I'll help you."



LATER THAT day I contacted the other members of the Youth League committee and arranged a special meeting for the next day. First, however, I made sure that Petrak, the Party contact man who made a career out of talking socialism, would be unable to attend. What we needed was a frank discussion and a united front.

I opened the meeting on a jocular note. "I think it's inane to try to explain, to a person whose brain is perfectly sane, why he should entrain on a mining campaign. Financial gain? The absence of rain? That he helps to maintain our life so humane? The fame he'd obtain? The lovely terrain? The good that the strain would do to his frame?"

"I maintain that it's plain our labor's in vain," returned Alena, "but first let's see that list they gave you." Her father was a big shot at the regional Party committee, but she was a good egg and absolutely trustworthy. "Just as I thought!" she cried. "Practically all of them are young people. We're chased from one weekend brigade to another, made to collect scrap materials, forced to organize political courses. Pre-military training for the boys, civil defense and red cross work for the girls, and on top of that half the kids attend night school. Here we are, with our tongues hanging out from exhaustion and our eyes red from lack of sleep; they tie us into a knot, paste a label on us and send us off to the coal mines." She was furious, and of course she was exaggerating. Hardly any of the activities of the Youth League group were attended by even half the members.

"Anyway," she went on, naively turning to her fiancé, "Franta can't go because we're seriously thinking of getting married. What about you, Pavel?"

"Oh," I said, "my boss won't let me go of course, but I'll stand by you."

"I'll help you out too," put in Jan. He was in his last year of night trade school, and thus he was fairly secure. But even he had to think of the future, and one cannot survive alone in a collectivist society. That was probably the reason we trusted each other.

"Look here, kids!" I said. "The whole plant is going to be wracked with illness, with new pregnancies and phobias of all kinds. This time it won't be enough. They won't even read those excuses up there. The A. D. D. has to supply four voluntary workers, starting in three weeks, and he'll do it or else he won't be a Deputy Director for long. The Party organization in the plant will stand behind him, because they



Dikobraz, January 19, 1961

all stick together just as we do. And they really need some new volunteers, what with the accidents in the mines and a lot of people trying to get away. The first week will be allotted to patriotic appeals and cries of socialist consciousness, but I don't think anybody around here will fall for that anymore. Another week for big promises, but people won't swallow that either, not since Kolomaznik didn't get the new apartment they promised him two years ago. That leaves one final week for pressure and threats. They can always find an excuse for firing anybody they want to. And they can give him the sort of reference that will prevent him from finding a job anywhere except in a coal mine. But they'll try to fall just short of that, because they have to supply volunteers from the plant and a dismissal might not count—especially since we're already short of workers. However, they're good at sowing doubts and misgivings in people's minds, and if somebody doesn't break down I'll volunteer to carry the plant banner in the next May Day parade. The only thing we can do is to work out a system of mutual protection; it sounds better if you don't argue just for yourself. We should try to help the others as well, and get the older workers into our scheme. But it's obvious that somebody will have to go, there's no escaping that. I wonder how they managed to get volunteers to risk death during the war. Maybe the atmosphere was different then. Anyhow, this isn't a problem we can solve. We can only try to slip through the net."

"But if they paid more," said Alena, "wouldn't they get real volunteers?"

"Silly, you have no idea of economics. If you pay people more they'll start drinking and skipping shifts. That's no way to increase productivity."

The meeting was concluded in the usual way with a singing of the Hymn of Democratic Youth. We approved the following entry in the minutes: "The Committee spontaneously endorsed the new Party and government resolution and discussed the means of assuring the best method of aiding and furthering the plant management in the fulfillment of this responsible task."



Dikobraz, November 3, 1960



SUBSEQUENT EVENTS followed my prediction exactly. After all, socialism is a scientific system.

The first week passed in a ceaseless stream of Party, trade union and Youth League meetings. The subject was even raised at the annual membership meeting of the plant's Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League. Most people had to listen several times that week to the soporific speech of the chairman of the Party organization. One plucky fellow (evidently of working-class origin) even dared to repeat it word-for-word during the discussion that followed, and nobody batted an eyelid. Supporting resolutions were adopted unanimously. In spite of all the twitter, the birds remained in the bush.

On Monday of the second week, the Youth League committee was called to the A. D. D.'s office. It was during working hours, which showed that the situation was getting serious.

"I have been thinking," said the Administrative Deputy Director, "that when the boys who volunteer for the mines come back, they ought to be rewarded in some way for their positive attitude to the needs of our society. They might be recommended for night school in the high school or college level. We need people with spirit, and we should give them a chance to improve their qualifications. By the way, Pavel, there is also a chance that the plant might give someone a scholarship to the University. We've been talking that over with the Director."

As soon as we had left his office, I said: "Well, what do you think of that?"

"Oh, I guess he really means it. For the moment, anyway. Of course, the volunteer would have to take his chance that when he came back there would be sufficient funds available. Things can change a lot within a year."

"And once you're in the mines," mused Alena, "they may try to persuade you to stay another year. If you refuse, it will show that you aren't as patriotic as they thought you were."

"Oh, hell. The least we can do is to pass the word around. Let's hope somebody falls for it."

Thus passed the second week, still without success.

The third week began with a special session of the Party committee in the plant, and a tough speech by the Director himself. Firmness and resolution were written all over the faces of those who attended, as they left the room for their appointed tasks. The old Party fighting spirit was returning. The Administrative Deputy Director closeted himself with the Chief of the Personnel Department, and they began going over the secret files of the employees. The whole plant was apprehensive by now, and groups of workers could be seen here and there discussing and wildly gesticulating. Those with exceptionally bad consciences and even worse personnel files kept their noses buried in their work as if the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan depended only on them.

Starting on Tuesday morning, various employees were called one by one into the A. D. D.'s office. The chairman of the Party organization was also present. His function was to keep his eyes fixed on the person being interviewed, curling his lips and sinisterly clicking his tongue. He must have been good at it, because he made everyone droop like a wet sock. The A. D. D.'s desk was covered with papers bearing lists of names with various secret marks, and notations underlined in red or blue which always concluded with an exclamation or a question mark.

The A. D. D. would try to be friendly at first. "Don't you want to sit down? We only want to ask a couple of questions, we won't keep you more than a minute. By the way, we didn't see you at the May Day parade two years ago. You had a cold? Too bad. You say your father was a bricklayer, but according to the application you filled out for your previous employer he was a farmer. He was a bricklayer first and then a farmer? Are you sure you haven't any relatives in the West?

The old hands, accustomed to this game, armed themselves in absolute indifference during the interview. However, the weaker ones soon lost their confidence, and by the time they had slouched up to the A. D. D.'s office for the second or third time they were beginning to blush and stammer.



THE CYNICAL and the unaffected started a betting pool as to whose defenses would crack first. Alena went around with drawn lips and a misty look on her face. Her Franta had been hired by the plant despite lousy political references, and he was beginning to wonder whether he shouldn't volunteer before it was too late. She had tried to get her father to help, but he didn't want to risk burning his fingers in such an affair. The Youth League committee called a hurried conference, but we couldn't talk freely because somehow Petrak, the professional Communist, had found out and was present. Alena tried to tell a little story about a similar situation at another plant two years before, when a young girl had been driven to suicide because she was forced to volunteer for a collective farm. Alena was hoping the story would be spread around and have some influence on events, but Petrak only remarked that the girl had been a weak, negative person for whom there is no place in the new society anyhow.



Dikobraz, October 6, 1960



Dikobraz, June 9, 1960

To everybody's amazement, by Wednesday afternoon there was still no volunteer. Well, Thursday was bound to bring a solution.

But Thursday morning proved to be memorable for another reason. First, Alena and Franta happened to collide in the corridor. Alena was carrying her typewriter into another office, and she let it drop bang onto Franta's foot. The upshot was three small bones broken and one candidate for the voluntary brigade immobilized for six weeks with his foot in a plaster cast.

This had scarcely been announced when a new event broke upon the turbulent atmosphere. Bycek, an engineer and one of the most indispensable of all, was found in the cloakroom tampering with someone's locker. He was at once made to open his own, and it revealed an interesting collection of various articles that had recently been missing.

The Director, who was informed at once, was furious. It was a discredit to the plant, he said, to have a thief on its staff. He would have to call in the police, and the district attorney would probably come prying around too. If Bycek were to be tried and sentenced, it would mean finding a new engineer. And the district labor department wouldn't be too cooperative either.

But the ways of Providence are inscrutable, even in the best of all possible worlds. By mid-afternoon all problems had been solved, and peace once more stalked the yard of Kablo-Vysocany, national enterprise. There was even reason to hope that it might last almost till summer.

Word went round that Comrade Bycek had only a slight touch of kleptomania, but was otherwise a superb fellow, an excellent worker, his allegiance to communism beyond doubt. The Administrative Deputy Director had once more discussed his indispensability with the chief engineer and found that, with a few adjustments, it would be possible to do without Bycek for a year. This would mean more work for the others, but who wouldn't gladly accept such a sacrifice for the glorious future? Comrade Bycek had enthusiastically volunteered for a year in the coal mines. His family would certainly be proud of him, and a brigade worker of such technical qualifications would be sure to lend credit to the name of Kablo-Vysocany. The plant would give him a rousing send-off on Saturday at the end of the first shift. Everyone clapped Bycek on the back, and there was even talk of nominating him for the title of Model Worker for the first quarter.



Dikobraz, November 17, 1960

Pitfalls in Cultural Exchange

On July 12 Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia) carried an announcement of a new cultural exchange between Bulgaria and France providing for an exchange of lecturers and teachers in the fields of science, education, art and literature. Hailing the agreement as "encouraging," the newspaper was silent about an episode which occurred just a month before, when a French instructor on loan to Sofia State University was accused of spying and stirring up trouble and of "being an intolerable nuisance." Narodna Mladej (Sofia), the organ of the Bulgarian Youth League, portrayed the instructor as a sinister espionage agent and exposed the "Two Faces of Monsieur Leclerc" as follows:

"Who is Monsieur Leclerc? What kind of person is he?

"Actually, Monsieur Leclerc has two faces. One of them is well known. It can be found in the official catalogue of Sofia State University, listed under 'instructor in French, Jean Michel Leclerc, date of appointment 1957. Appointed on the basis of the bilateral agreement between Bulgaria and France regulating the exchange of instructors.' Everything is in perfect order, according to the data. But with regard to Leclerc's activity there is another story, and here we see Leclerc's other face. What is behind M. Leclerc's continuous smile, known to many at the Sofia State University, behind his polite handshake, behind his well-cut fashionable suit?

"M. Leclerc is not only a qualified instructor, he is sociable. What a wonderful feature, one might remark. But suddenly it appears that M. Leclerc uses his charm only on those people who go to France. He continually visits our cultural institutes to find out who will be sent to France so that he can visit them, give them advice and instructions. Then he gives them the impression that they are being sent to France by the good will of the French legation. . . . This is not a matter of foreign benevolence but of a right based on an international agreement between Bulgaria and France. M. Leclerc also tries to select those students and teachers who want to go to France by giving them a peculiar examination in French in order to find out about their political qualities. Who has given him this right?

"The cultural agreement between the two countries is built on an equal basis and should develop on an equal basis. Yet Leclerc has taken for models of conduct in a foreign country people like General Challe and General Zeller who have been condemned by France herself. How else can we explain M. Lelerc's unpardonable attitude toward the country which has welcomed him hospitably. . . .

"M. Leclerc is a guest in Bulgaria and has the impertinence to bestow degrees of culture on Bulgarian intellectuals and writers, to divide them into categories. When he cannot attract writers and scientific workers, his language reverts to the language of men like Challe and Zeller. In such a case we ask who is at fault here? . . . Is it not this man who has sneaked as a guest into our national home and who tries to take away our national honor, our ideological loyalty, our political allegiance? . . .

"Since April, M. Leclerc has been distributing five types of questionnaires. Now we know that Leclerc graduated in philosophy and literature, and it is natural that his scholarly interests lie in those fields. But many of the questions he asks are aimed at determining the political physiognomy of the persons involved and at uncovering political attitudes or data about the industrialization of certain Bulgarian regions. Are such questions within the range of scholarly interests of the philosopher or linguist? Do they not intrude into an entirely different and special field? M. Leclerc says that he is interested in ethnopsychology for his doctoral dissertation. If he were really motivated by purely scientific interest he would turn for assistance to Bulgarian scientific institutes, especially since he knows that questionnaires of his kind have been rejected by science since they serve only the reconnaissance purposes of the West. M. Leclerc tries to take advantage of science. But you are awkward, M. Leclerc! Your game is outside science and far removed from the atmosphere of good cultural relations between France and Bulgaria.


"Madame Leclerc is also meddling in M. Leclerc's unscientific adventures. Unlike her husband, Madame Leclerc prefers to concentrate on young people. She promises them trips abroad and even marriage. . . . We hesitate to use the word that comes to mind in such a case, since no procurer's motives guide Madame Leclerc—but her promises are against the price of national honor. What a spectacle!

"There is no need to go back into history to prove that our people hold progressive French culture in high esteem. French literature occupies first place in our country in all the literature of the capitalist countries. But when people try to use French culture for unclean purposes we cannot tolerate it.

"A French proverb says: 'One does not talk about rope in the home of a hanged man.' Is it then necessary to remind M. Leclerc that the place he occupies in our university should be immediately vacated in favor of another Frenchman who will come here with the sincere intention to cooperate in the cultural consolidation of our people and the hard-working and honest French people? After the second, true face of M. Leclerc has been exposed it does not seem that this is necessary.

"Let us therefore say: 'Enough, M. Leclerc. Hospitality has its cultural limits. When the guest oversteps them, the host shows him the door. A la porte, Monsieur Leclerc!'

yugoslavia in the limelight



by

IMMANUEL BIRNBAUM

The Communist regime of Marshal Tito still pursues an independent path both at home and abroad.

AS ONE ENTERS Yugoslavia from Italy, crossing the border at the long-contested Trieste region, one has the same impression as at any other border between the West and the Communist world. The towns suddenly look poorer, the people worse clothed. Automobile traffic, very heavy on the Italian side, almost ceases. Even on the best parts of the Yugoslav highway one meets only two or three private cars in the same space of time in which one passed a hundred on the Italian coastal road. Slovenian Istria, with its infertile and chalky soil, is not exactly the richest part of Yugoslavia, but neither is it the poorest. A glance at the statistical handbook put out in Belgrade shows that the impression gained from the highway was not misleading: with a population of 18 million, Yugoslavia has only 60,000 passenger cars. Although this is four times more than it had five years ago, it is little more than a third of the number to be found in the city of Munich, with a population of only a million.

These visual differences are less striking if one enter Yugoslavia from southern Austria, because in that area there are industrial cities like Maribor and administrative centers like the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana. But even in this relatively prosperous area, the economic and social differences between Western and Eastern Europe are still palpable; the Yugoslavs themselves, who now go abroad in increasing numbers, especially to Italy and Austria, are particularly conscious of it. However, the Yugoslavs also have another standard with which they measure the degree of their economic and cultural development: a comparison with their own past, particularly with the early postwar

years when they suffered from wartime destruction and from political and social revolution.

By this mark, the country's progress is obvious everywhere. At the end of the war Yugoslavia was overwhelmingly agricultural, and predominantly a country of smallholders. Today, less than one-half of the population is engaged in farming. The state of agriculture has changed fundamentally, not in ownership—the small private peasant still prevails—but rather because the intervention of the state and the encouragement of cooperative methods have done much to rationalize the techniques of farming. The Tito regime likes to speak of Yugoslavia as a "medium-developed industrial country." This really anticipates what the government hopes to achieve with the current five-year plan which began this year. Nevertheless, there has been more industrial development in Yugoslavia than in some of the neighboring countries of the Soviet bloc.

To the new countries of Africa and Asia, the economy of Yugoslavia has a quite different significance than it has for Western Europeans. To some extent they see Tito's country as a model for their own economic development, and it is significant to them that Yugoslavia has achieved her progress without joining either of the two power blocs. In Nasser's Egypt they speak of the "Belgrade pattern" as the model for the recent far-reaching economic measures decreed by the Cairo government. When Indonesian politicians are asked what system of political economy they have in mind, they tend more and more to reply: a socialist order after Tito's pattern. At the last Belgrade meeting of the Socialist League of the Working Population of Yu-

goslavia (formerly the People's Front of Yugoslavia), there were many visitors, not only from Africa and Asia but also from Latin America, who were much more open in their sympathy than they have been at similar meetings held in Moscow or in the West. Tito, during his long trips through distant countries, has systematically courted the leading men of many of the new Asian and African countries. This has been effective not only in drawing those countries closer to Yugoslavia but also in strengthening the influence of "Titoism" upon their new programs of economic development.

The Changing Economic Pattern

THIS SUCCES d'estime is the more remarkable since the present Yugoslav economic system has not yet achieved final perfection even in the opinion of its own leaders. It was first outlined in 1950-51 by a few independent minds under the leadership of the late Boris Kidric, after the break between Moscow and Belgrade. Tito has never been doctrinaire about problems of economic development but has always been ready to learn from the experiments—and particularly from the failures—of his colleagues. More than one foreign visitor, when discussing matters of political economy with Tito, has heard him say: "If we cannot make progress this way we shall have to try another." Recently there have been two quite thoroughgoing reforms in Yugoslav economic policy. One has to do with foreign exchange, and the other with a new system of prices in the domestic economy.

In the modification of the economy originally carried out by Kidric, the various public enterprises of the federal government and of the republics and communes received more autonomy in their operations and also a chance to earn foreign currency for themselves by means of exports. They were required to turn over part of their foreign earnings to the state, but as their export sales rose they were allowed to retain an increasing proportion with which to import their own machinery, raw materials, etc. The foreign exchange rate was fixed by a kind of semi-free system of clearing house operations, governed by supply and demand among the state enterprises and cooperative leagues engaged in foreign trade. The rate was announced periodically. Naturally the authorities could not allow the rates to fluctuate in complete freedom, nor could they allow a free market in foreign exchange, and the supply of foreign currency for tourists and for other ordinary uses was closely controlled. The way of fixing these multiple exchange rates was changed several times, and it is not necessary to cover it here since it has been superseded by the new reform which establishes a single rate of exchange.

Since the beginning of 1961 the dinar rate has been 750 to the dollar (with the exception of a temporary rate for tourists of 600 to the dollar). The new reform was undertaken at the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It should simplify Yugoslav currency dealings, facilitate foreign trade and make it possible for other countries to carry on normal credit relations with Yugoslav

banks. This is important for Belgrade, because the major part of Yugoslav trade is now directed toward the West rather than to the Soviet bloc. Moreover, in the long run the Yugoslavs hope to increase their trade with the under-developed countries, although this will be possible only to a modest extent because of the limited industrial capacities of these countries, and also because of transportation difficulties. Many of these countries, in turn, must conform to the recommendations of the Monetary Fund because their solvency depends on it.

The reform of the domestic price system was announced in a speech last February by Mijalko Todorovic, who is at present the leading policymaker in economic matters. In principle the reform is aimed at reducing state control over production and distribution, while maintaining influence on prices. Agricultural prices are to be kept below the cost of production to prevent a substantial rise in living costs; thus the state will continue to exempt agriculture from general taxes and to subsidize the purchase of machinery, fertilizers, etc. Transportation rates are also to be subsidized. In industry, prices are to be adjusted to allow a higher rate of profit in coal mining, for example, than in the metallurgical, textile and electric power industries. Prices will not only be regulated by the state but also, in retail trade, they will be subject to the supervision of public control organs. Todorovic, to be sure, emphasized that the new system was to be based on the free formation of prices, but he added the reservation that market conditions were not yet stable enough to carry this out fully.

It would be wrong to see in these Yugoslav economic reforms a political deviation to the "left" or the "right." They are practical adjustments to the current economic situation, and in some cases moreover they are only temporary and short-term adjustments. The official propaganda, to be sure, seeks to justify them on mainly ideological grounds. But this is less true of the recent reforms than it was of the basic transformation carried out in 1950-51. The nucleus of that change—decentralization of control over industry, worker self-management in the larger factories and enterprises, voluntary membership in agricultural cooperatives (which are now only organizations for procuring credit, buying supplies, selling produce, breeding livestock, etc.)—those basic reforms have been maintained and expanded, and are considered sound.

Relations With Moscow

CITICISM FROM abroad, even Communist criticism, has not deterred Yugoslavia's leading men from pursuing their own economic policy. Edward Kardelj, who was influential in formulating the basic principles of this policy, frankly confessed in his treatise on agriculture published two years ago that the number of tractors in Czechoslovakia and also in the Soviet Union was greater per acre of arable land than in Yugoslavia. He ascribed this to differences in history and economic geography, and expected that Yugoslavia would be able to eliminate this lag without abandoning the principles of 1950.

The charge of "revisionism" which has been leveled

against the Yugoslavs by other Communist Parties, and most vehemently by the Chinese, who argue that Belgrade has revised the aims and methods of Leninism, has not had any effect in Yugoslavia. Stalin made the same reproaches at the beginning of the fifties, and Tito's men successfully defended themselves; the second edition of this argument has so little originality and comes from so far away that it causes relatively little concern. The last serious discussion of "revisionism" took place in 1957 during a consultation of Communist Party leaders from a number of countries on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution. It primarily concerned Belgrade's foreign policy. The participants leveled an indictment of the recently published program of the Yugoslav League of Communists, which they cited as rejecting every policy of the Soviet bloc, and also as not being a Communist program. The Yugoslav participants in the meeting refused to sign the common declaration of policy for the Communist bloc ("the complete solidarity of the socialist camp"), and this made doubly clear the break between the Yugoslavs and the other Communist Parties.

The conflict that ensued was by no means as sharp as the battle that had been fought between Stalin and Tito. There was no new breach in diplomatic and economic relations between Yugoslavia and the Eastern bloc. There was no massing of troops at the borders, and the propaganda this time was directed only against the Yugoslav Party and not against the state. Thus the Yugoslav policymakers had less need to look to the West for support than they had during the conflict that followed the rupture of 1948. The condemnation of Yugoslav revisionism was solemnly repeated at the conference of leaders of 81 Communist Parties in Moscow in November 1960, and this time without explicit mention of another deviation from the proscribed line—that of the Chinese. The Yugoslavs, who did not participate in the 1960 discussions, reacted with protests. However, they regarded the Resolution as an academic affair rather than as a political act.

In their assessment of the Moscow resolutions, the Belgrade leaders were guided by two considerations. They took the criticism of their policies to be a superficial compromise between the strongly hostile Chinese view and the attitude of the Soviet leadership; among the latter, they believe, some men—including Khrushchev himself—have considerable sympathy for Yugoslav policy. This belief was supported by the continuation of good relations between the governments. Even Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declared, not very long after the Moscow Resolution of 1960, that these relations were good. This encouraged Foreign Minister Koca Popovic to go to Moscow last July, where he had friendly conversations with members of the Soviet government.

Not much is known about the subject of these conversations, but official Yugoslav statements give a hint as to the problems on which Moscow and Belgrade are in accord, or on which their policies are at least parallel with each other, and as to the other matters where disagreements persist. On German questions President Tito has repeatedly taken a public position very similar to that of Khrushchev.

He has not, it is true, spoken as roughly as has Khrushchev. But he has condemned West Germany's rearming under NATO, has asked for Western recognition of the so-called German Democratic Republic—which Yugoslavia recognized some years ago—and has agreed in principle to establishment of West Berlin as a "free city." The liquidation of Western colonialism is another field in which, again and again, he has struck the same note as Khrushchev. Yugoslav diplomacy has taken almost the same positions as Moscow on the Congo, on Algeria and on Laos. Tito has also participated personally as well as through his representatives in the criticism of the UN Secretary General, although he has never gone so far as to demand Hammarskjold's removal, or to approve publicly Khrushchev's proposal for a reform of the UN secretariat so as to give control to a "troika" composed of representatives of the East, the West and the neutrals.

The New Bloc of Neutrals

IT IS AN open question whether Yugoslavia's campaign to form close connections with the new countries of Asia and Africa represents a setback or an advance in the Communist penetration of these countries. The Chinese consider these efforts entirely negative, above all because they are directed toward non-proletarian elements and political forces which want nothing to do with Communism as a political movement, such as Nasser's government in the United Arab Republic. The Soviet leaders, who have cooperated with such forces for a long time—in China, Chiang Kai-shek was once one of their protégés—think less severely of Tito's tactics. Khrushchev's aforementioned troika proposal certainly implies the possibility of cooperation between the Communist countries and the new neutrals. One precondition of such a development would be the alliance of these neutrals and their winning over as a group to good relations with the Communist members of the world organization. Soviet policy certainly does not set much



Recurrent Berlin crisis is here compared with a seesaw; the Western powers, opposite the USSR, ask: "How long will this toy of ours last?"
Review (Belgrade), July 1961

value on the neutrality of other nations, and such a typically neutral statesman as Dag Hammarskjold is notoriously regarded by the Soviets as one of their worst enemies. In view of Moscow's interest in the attitude of the neutrals, and the simultaneous efforts by the West to achieve closer relations with the uncommitted new countries, Tito's role as an organizer of cooperation among neutral countries has increasing political significance.

The first conference of a group of such nations was scheduled to meet in mid-September in the Yugoslav capital. Tito, along with Sukarno and Nasser, is one of the inviting leaders. The selection of the countries to be included was thoroughly discussed at a preliminary conference in Cairo in June, and has been rather narrowly restricted. None of the European neutrals is to participate. Exploratory contacts were made with some of these governments, and produced no result. The selection of the Asian and African participants has obviously been strongly influenced by Cairo. Israel, for example, has not been invited, while the backward Emirate of Yemen has. Tunisia, which had rather delicate relations with Cairo, was not at first invited, while Morocco, the UAR's partner in North Africa, was. India, it seems, had other ideas about the selection of participants, but these did not prevail. Tito, who has maintained close personal relations with Nasser for several years, openly supported his wishes. The result should give the Belgrade meeting a sharply anti-colonial tone. An effort will no doubt be made to obtain for this group of neutrals a certain say in the international management of aid to underdeveloped countries. Finally, in view of the heightened tension between East and West, they will engage in efforts to resume the disarmament talks and to further the solution of questions such as the German problem or the conflict in southeast Asia.

The prospects for success in these widely different fields of action vary. Countries which cannot produce or purchase modern nuclear weapons, missiles or heavy long-distance bombers can hardly have much influence in discussions of armament and disarmament. The solution of the German problem is, according to international law, a matter for the four conquering powers. Moreover, the participants in the Belgrade conference have different views on this problem. Yugoslavia has recognized the German Democratic Republic and has entered into diplomatic relations with East Berlin. Her relations with West Germany are limited to consular, trade and payment matters, including also a fairly lively cultural and tourist traffic (the German Federal Republic providing the largest number of tourists in Yugoslavia). The United Arab Republic, Indonesia, India and most of the other participants in the current meeting, have diplomatic relations with Bonn but not with Moscow's German satellite. For this reason alone they cannot engage in a campaign to settle the Berlin problem along Moscow's lines, including the recognition of the GDR, because it would mean a rupture of relations with Bonn. The assumption that this is Belgrade's aim at the conference is dubious. Yugoslavia has tried of late to strengthen her economic relations with West Germany. She has also increased the number of her official representatives in the

Federal Republic and raised them to the rank of consuls general. The real focus of Yugoslav interests is not in Central Europe but in the Eastern Mediterranean and the underdeveloped countries.

Belgrade in World Politics

TITO'S MAIN concern, however, is to broaden the basis of his foreign policy. The Balkan Alliance served this purpose at the time of the break with Stalin, linking Yugoslavia with the two NATO countries of Greece and Turkey. This alliance disintegrated when the Greeks and Turks quarreled over Cyprus, and has not been renewed since; all that remains are good-neighborly relations between Belgrade and Athens. After Khrushchev's visit of reconciliation to Belgrade in 1955, Tito sought to create another diplomatic basis within the Eastern bloc, but without joining it. Those were the years when "Titoist" influence was felt in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Khrushchev tried to play off Yugoslav "revisionism" against the "dogmatism" of the Chinese. Unable to prevent the development of what Togliatti, the Italian Communist leader, calls "polycentrism" within the Communist world, he hoped in this way to counteract the influence of Peiping. When Yugoslav ambitions were checked by a counteroffensive from Peiping, and when relations cooled between Belgrade and Moscow along with the resolutions of the Party conferences held first in Moscow, then in Bucharest and then again in Moscow, Tito had to look for other friends among the leaders of the new countries outside Europe. In doing so he did not, however, renounce all hope of influence in Eastern Europe.

Whenever there are symptoms of increasing tension between Moscow and Peiping, Belgrade's interest in better relations with the Soviet leadership grows. At these moments the Soviet leadership feels more inclined to include Tito in the play of Communist power politics. Should Belgrade ever abandon its reluctance to become a member of the Soviet bloc, it would at that moment lose its ability to maneuver and would have only the role of a satellite like Czechoslovakia or Romania. For this reason Yugoslav policy will always try to maintain a certain distance from the bloc, but at the same time it will not withdraw far enough to establish a permanent and determined cooperation with the Western world:

The role which the Yugoslavs aspire to in world politics is the leadership, or co-leadership, of a closed group of states outside the big power blocs but within the framework of the United Nations; they want to concern themselves with the problems of disarmament, aid to underdeveloped countries and the creation of a more stable system of international law. To such tasks the Yugoslav leaders would bring a notable diplomatic talent, along with such important qualities as independent-mindedness, perseverance and courage. The economic and military basis from which they operate is not as large as their ambitions, but they bring to their work a spirit of self-reliance which has often impressed the mighty.

Economic Statistics

by

ELIZABETH MARBURY BASS

MANY STUDENTS of the Soviet bloc have long felt a need for a critical summary of the statistics published annually in the eight countries that belong to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. These countries comprise a more-or-less integrated political and economic area, and their published statistics offer bench marks for the progress of the economic programs of the Communist governments.

The tables printed on the following pages are the first in a series of statistical summaries compiled by the author from many different publications of the Soviet-bloc statistical offices. The material presented covers the years 1950 to 1960, except in cases where no figures are yet available. The purpose of these tables is to present important data from sources which are not easily accessible, and to provide information on their composition and coverage.

The statistics released by Communist countries vary widely in quality. Measures of over-all economic progress, such as statistics of national income or indexes of total industrial output, are often useless for purposes of economic analysis or for making comparisons between the Soviet bloc and the countries of the West. In the important sector of agriculture, which is still the predominant means of livelihood in much of the area, the official statistics have often been manipulated and falsified, to the point where Premier Khrushchev himself has doubted their reality. On the other hand, statistics of population and many data measuring physical units are believed by students to be fairly reliable.

The fuel and power data presented here are among the groups of official Communist statistics which are thought to be reasonably accurate, within their specific terms of reference. The terms, it should be noted, tend to be broader than those of measures often used by other countries. The gross quantity of coal extracted, for example, is significantly higher than the amount available for sale or use outside the mines, and, of course, the statistics give no inkling of the quality of the coal, which is an important consideration for the consumer.




The notes accompanying the tables indicate what is known of the data's coverage, but a note of caution should be added: the state of information on this subject varies from country to country, and in some cases (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania) the primary sources give virtually no indication of coverage. In a few other instances, the definitions given in official publications conflict with those published by United Nations agencies. In the table notes, preference was given to the official source in cases of con-



EAST EUROPE



USSR



COAL OF ALL TYPES [THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS]

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Albania	41	52	79	105	149	195	224	236	256	288	
Bulgaria	5,928	6,414	7,410	8,345	8,926	10,051	10,817	11,889	12,730	15,360	17,135
Czechoslovakia	45,965	48,560	53,528	54,691	59,465	62,887	69,710	75,197	82,650	80,208	86,029
East Germany	139,855	154,456	161,216	175,390	184,561	203,294	207,509	215,348	217,873	217,624	228,120
Hungary	13,268	15,270	18,564	21,009	21,536	22,316	20,590	21,202	24,249	25,357	26,523
Poland	82,837	86,899	89,516	94,352	97,528	100,521	101,332	100,050	102,522	108,400	113,765
Romania	3,893	4,630	5,224	5,497	5,555	6,104	6,472	7,055	7,388	7,977	8,163
East Europe TOTAL	291,787	316,281	335,537	359,389	377,720	405,368	416,654	430,977	447,668	455,214	479,735
USSR	261,089	281,928	300,875	320,422	347,109	391,259	429,174	463,470	496,112	506,557	513,000
TOTAL	552,876	598,209	636,412	679,811	724,829	796,627	845,828	894,447	943,780	961,771	992,735

HARD COAL [THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS]

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Albania	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bulgaria	157	190	237	269	294	293	370	385	380	503	580
Czechoslovakia	18,456	18,392	20,270	20,341	21,605	22,136	23,411	24,181	25,812	26,505	27,626
East Germany	2,805	3,204	2,754	2,638	2,648	2,682	2,743	2,753	2,903	2,841	2,720
Hungary	1,400	1,619	1,718	1,993	2,435	2,692	2,371	2,277	2,626	2,734	2,847
Poland	78,001	82,000	84,440	88,719	91,619	94,476	95,149	94,096	94,981	99,106	104,438
Romania	2,733	3,227	3,377	3,325	3,191	3,353	3,458	3,636	3,906	4,148	—
East Europe TOTAL	103,552	108,632	112,796	117,285	121,792	125,632	127,502	127,328	130,608	135,837	138,211
USSR	185,225	202,464	215,009	224,315	243,681	276,615	304,002	328,502	353,030	365,171	—
TOTAL	288,779	311,086	327,805	341,600	365,473	402,247	431,504	455,830	483,638	501,008	—

BROWN COAL [THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS]

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Albania	41	52	79	105	149	195	224	236	256	288
Bulgaria	5,711	6,224	7,173	8,076	8,632	9,758	10,447	11,504	12,350	14,857	16,555
Czechoslovakia	27,509	30,168	33,258	34,350	37,860	40,751	46,299	51,016	56,838	53,703	58,403
East Germany	137,050	151,252	158,462	172,752	181,913	200,612	205,866	212,595	214,970	214,783	225,400
Hungary	11,868	13,651	16,846	19,016	19,101	19,624	18,218	18,925	21,623	22,623	23,676
Poland	4,836	4,899	5,076	5,633	5,909	6,045	6,183	5,954	7,541	9,258	9,327
Romania	1,159	1,402	1,847	2,172	2,363	2,751	3,014	3,419	3,482	3,829	—
East Europe TOTAL	188,174	207,648	222,741	242,104	255,927	279,736	290,251	303,649	317,060	319,341	333,361
USSR	75,864	79,464	85,866	96,107	103,428	114,644	125,172	134,968	143,082	141,386	—
TOTAL	264,038	287,112	308,607	338,211	359,355	394,380	415,423	438,617	460,142	460,727	—

NOTES:

— indicates that output was zero or negligible.
.. indicates that data were not available.

Totals for Eastern Europe and for the area as a whole are the sum of the figures shown and therefore exclude the countries for which data were not available.

flict, and it has been assumed that the smaller countries follow the practices of the Soviet Union in the absence of information to the contrary.




United Nations publications were used as supplementary sources in cases where they contained later and more detailed information than any official publication yet received here. However, most of the figures were taken directly from the original statistical publications of the countries concerned, with preference given to the most recent source wherever there were inconsistencies. All the 1960 figures should, in any case, be regarded as preliminary data.

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NOTES TO COAL TABLES

Hard coal comprises bituminous and anthracite; brown coal includes lignite. All data except those for Czechoslovakia are believed to represent gross output of coal before washing, and including coal consumed at mines. The data for Czechoslovak brown coal output conform to this definition, but the hard coal series and hence the Czechoslovak totals, differ as follows: data for 1950-59 represent net output after washing, but include mine consumption, and the figure for 1960 represents output net of both washing losses and mine consumption. The difference between these two net measures was 1,380 thousand tons in 1959. Czechoslovak data for gross extraction of hard coal, comparable to the figures for other countries, are available for a part of the time period covered above (in thou. metric tons): 1954—22,626; 1955—23,158; 1956—24,411; 1957—25,328; 1958—27,179; 1959—28,514.



ELECTRIC POWER [MILLIONS OF KILOWATT HOURS]

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Albania	21	24	39	50	62	85	104	125	150	177	
Bulgaria	797	1,015	1,352	1,557	1,730	2,073	2,393	2,656	3,024	3,869	4,657
Czechoslovakia	9,280	10,296	11,634	12,363	13,610	15,013	16,591	17,720	19,620	21,884	24,450
East Germany	19,466	21,463	23,183	24,247	26,044	28,695	31,182	32,735	34,874	37,236	40,300
Hungary	3,001	3,506	4,197	4,615	4,824	5,428	5,201	5,447	6,479	7,093	7,615
Poland	9,421	10,507	11,984	13,679	15,469	17,751	19,495	21,157	23,962	26,380	29,285
Romania	2,113	2,473	2,886	3,411	3,697	4,340	4,930	5,440	6,184	6,802	7,626
East Europe TOTAL	44,099	49,284	55,275	59,922	65,436	73,385	79,896	85,280	94,293	103,441	113,933
USSR	91,226	104,022	119,116	134,325	150,695	170,225	191,653	209,688	233,371	264,000	292,000
TOTAL	135,325	153,306	174,391	194,247	216,131	243,610	271,549	294,968	327,664	367,441	405,933

Includes power produced by both central plants and plants installed in industrial enterprises. Most countries' data cover all installations, but

Czechoslovakia excludes plants with an installed capacity under 100 kilowatts and Poland excludes enterprise plants of under 500 kilowatts capacity.

CRUDE PETROLEUM [THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS]

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Albania	132	122	149	149	175	208	266	490	403	479	
Bulgaria	—	—	—	—	5	150	247	285	222	192	200
Czechoslovakia	63	119	..	122	125	107	108	108	106	123	137
East Germany	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Hungary	512	499	598	846	1,217	1,601	1,202	675	830	1,036	1,215
Poland	162	181	215	189	184	180	184	181	175	175	194
Romania	5,047	6,211	8,002	9,058	9,741	10,555	10,920	11,180	11,336	11,438	11,500
East Europe TOTAL	5,916	7,132	8,964	10,364	11,447	12,801	12,927	12,919	13,072	13,443	13,246
USSR	37,878	42,253	47,311	52,777	59,281	70,793	83,806	98,346	113,216	129,557	148,000
TOTAL	43,794	49,385	56,275	63,141	70,728	83,594	96,733	111,265	126,288	143,000	161,246

All data are believed to represent extraction of crude petroleum, including oil shale and excluding natural gasoline.

NATURAL GAS [MILLIONS OF CUBIC METERS]

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia	19	168	172	173	274	772	1,246
East Germany	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Hungary	379	403	498	547	555	545	452	411	379	334	340
Poland	183	277	313	319	358	393	436	419	384	424	549
Romania	3,243	4,044	4,953	5,595	5,826	6,169	6,756	7,297	8,313	9,305	..
East Europe TOTAL	3,824	4,724	5,764	6,629	6,911	7,280	7,918	8,899	10,322		
USSR	5,761	6,252	6,384	6,868	7,511	8,981	12,067	18,583	28,085	35,386	..
TOTAL	9,585	10,976	12,148	13,497	14,422	16,261	19,985	27,482	38,407		

Data for Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR represent output exclusive of gas repressed or wasted, according to United Nations sources, while

Hungarian data include repressed gas and Romanian figures cover both repressuring and waste.



Polish Mercury, printed in Cracow in 1661, was the first Polish paper.
Prasa Polska (Warsaw), January 1961

Notes on the Polish Press

THE BEGINNING of 1961 marked the 300th anniversary of the Polish press, an event celebrated officially as all such occasions are, but one which was bound to produce gloomy reactions in many quarters where it did not lead merely to yawns. The Polish press which became famous in 1955, 1956 and 1957 for its vigorous appraisal of Polish life has subsided under the curbs imposed by Gomulka's censors in 1958, 1959 and 1960, and while today it can still lay claim to being the freest press in the Soviet bloc, its influence on the public it led in the "October period" has sharply decreased.

Results of a recent public opinion survey in Poland showed that 45 percent of the people interviewed considered the most authoritative source of information to be conversations with others—a rebuff journalists and the regime could not fail to understand. As for newspapermen themselves, a poll taken among them affirmed the fact that

there has been a definite "decline of interest in and lack of desire for discussions [in the press], so enthusiastically engaged in some time ago."¹ The absence of faith and interest in the press found ample corroboration in comments connected with the anniversary, and although many of the criticisms were muted, they left little doubt but that the struggle between the proponents of censorship and the advocates of more press freedom was still going on behind the scenes.

Barely funny and hardly flattering to the powers of the press was an anniversary "joke" printed in the popular daily *Zycie Warszawy*, which compared the Polish press to an old lady: "And we all know what old ladies are like; they do not see quite as well as they used to, they do not hear so well, you cannot always understand what they are talking about and they often like to repeat themselves. But all in all, they manage to get along."²

A bumbling old lady is a far cry from the Communist image of the press as a major ideological weapon in the construction of "Socialism." In commemoration of the anniversary, Premier Cyrankiewicz addressed himself to Polish journalists in an effort to convince them of the importance of their profession. Communist censorship, he implied, was censorship of the mildest sort:

"There are still some people, especially those not burdened with the knowledge of facts, who believe that the press in the capitalist countries is a free press. Yet the high social role of our press and the dignity of the profession of journalism in our country become that much more prominent when we compare them with the capitalist press which calls itself free. And this press which calls itself free remains in the overwhelming majority, in practically every capitalist country, under the absolute financial and personal influence of . . . a few all-powerful press concerns which control publications, printing plants and advertising. . . . It is true that the Polish press, the Socialist press, does not enjoy such freedom. Its duty is to tell the truth, to present reality such as it is—to present the perspective of its transformation and to unmask the falseness of reactionary propaganda. We have no reason to conceal the truth from public opinion, because truth and reality speak for us, for our policies, for Socialism. . . ."³

The Waning Weeklies

Despite Cyrankiewicz' claim that "truth and reality speak for us," the increased censorship since 1958 has resulted in a situation in which the press at best can only "hover about" the truth. Within the past three years, the regime has called for an end to "negative criticism," suppressed "revisionist" journals, and purged the staffs of newspapers and periodicals of "dissident" individuals. According to one source, 44 out of 122 publications studied "changed" their editors-in-chief in this period.⁴ The publications most affected by this policy have been the weeklies which played a prominent role in the thaw of 1955 and 1956. Since 1957, *Przeglad Kulturalny's* readership has dropped from 75,300 to 25,900 and *Nowa Kultura's* from 52,000 to 22,600.⁵ Both these literary journals have been thoroughly cleansed of controversial writers.

A similar drop in circulation was experienced by the illustrated weekly *Swiat*, which now has 106,000 readers as compared with 282,000 in 1957; as for the illustrated weekly for youth—*Dookla Swiata*—its entire staff was dismissed last year. The youth daily *Sztandar Młodzieży* also is in trouble, which has led to complaints that young people are interested only in entertainment and humor: "few are concerned with the country's economic and political problems."⁶

A prominent weekly which seems to be holding its own is *Polityka*, reputed to be Gomulka's unofficial organ. Under the editorship of Mieczyslaw Rakowski, *Polityka* occasionally opens its columns to contributors who on previous occasions have incurred the wrath of the censors, but it does not always do so with impunity. Rakowski recently got into hot water for printing some articles by the popular novelist Jerzy Andrzejewski, who criticized the organiza-

tion of a Communist youth rally and the institution of capital punishment. After a brief absence, Rakowski is again at *Polityka's* helm, but it is clear that all editors in Poland walk a dangerously thin ideological tightrope.

The Reading Public

While renewed censorship accounts for much of the press' troubles, analyses of circulation drops have fastened on such ills as poor reporting, public escapism and unimaginative editing. Basically, what seems to have happened is that after a brief bloom the intellectual weeklies found themselves in a kind of no man's land: deprived of the right to engage in real controversies and crusades, they limited their subject matter and watered down their criticism. As a result, they acquired what might be called a mild sociological cast and could not satisfy the strong palates of the readers. One Catholic writer—the popular Kisielewski—has suggested that the social-cultural weeklies are flagging because the public suspects that from "a concrete practical point of view nothing happens in the matters the weeklies write about. Therefore the reader has turned to popular magazines, either recreational or specialized, as a result of whose writing nothing can happen because they promise nothing more than they can give and they give concrete entertainment or information."⁷

Polityka blamed both the public and the periodicals, claiming, on the one hand, that the weeklies' circulation had decreased when the readers found no "political sensations" in them and, on the other, that the weeklies were not aware of the readers' interests although it was common knowledge that "governmental problems and political questions have recently ceased to fascinate the public." According to *Polityka*, "today's reader wants to see concrete journalism which concerns itself primarily with manners and morals. The weeklies, however, know neither how to go out and meet this change nor how to mould the taste of the readers themselves."

Accent on the Concrete

The weeklies, it would seem, have not acquiesced gracefully to limitations of their functions which, from the regime's viewpoint, they exceeded in the heady days of October 1956. As a solution for the weeklies and the press in general many critics have advocated the virtues of "concrete journalism." Reporters, however, apparently lack inspiration and find their profession financially and spiritually unrewarding. The Party youth paper, commenting

The Polish Press — August 1960

Publications	Circulation
50 dailies	5,335,368
111 weeklies	7,757,833
48 biweeklies	2,021,127
182 monthlies	2,891,123
145 bimonthlies, quarterlies, etc.	634,547

From *Prasa Polska*, January 1961

itd



Front cover of the students' magazine *itd (etcetera)*, Dec. 25.

on the decreasing number of good news stories, declared that it was foolish to blame young poets for refusing to write news reports when reporters did not want to write them either:

"They say it does not pay—one travels to the provinces for a couple of days, buys drinks to make contacts, catches cold, gets the flu, writes for several days and gets what? Not much less than the colleague who didn't go anywhere and wrote five editorials, two commentaries and four columns.

"The . . . status of on-the-spot reporting is falling—there are fewer and fewer articles showing real social ambition and literary freshness. And yet there were times when the best writers wrote news stories; today, with the exception of Brandys [well-known writer] they have given it up. They

write screen plays, poems for children, collaborate with the women's magazines . . . or turn to detective stories. Some of those who once were good reporters, today, having learned a foreign language, translate foreign memoirs. . . . People read about the secrets of Argentine spies and miserable translators get the money. Where are the fat years of reporting? Where are the patrons of reporting—the socio-cultural magazines supporting reporters and supported by them? Either they have ceased publication or, like *Nowa Kultura*, have abandoned reporting for theoretical war horses."¹⁰

Commenting on the same subject, the Party daily insisted that the poor quality of on-the-spot reporting could not be explained by poor pay. The payment for poetry was lower, the paper said, but even though writing a poem took at least as much effort as an article there were few complaints about a lack of poets:

"The cause of the unhealthy state of reporting lies . . . in its present and past character; in the past one reported on-the-spot news armed with a ready thesis; autopsy and local studies served to prove something known in advance. We realized later that the images thus formed were formal and prettified. But—did this discovery change the method of reporting? Not in the least. Only then the theses were not rosy but black; everything had to appear in reverse to the past. . . . This was not a struggle against schematism, it was its continuation. A struggle would have to begin with the question: What is it really like?"

The Party daily concluded that good reporting required an "objective concept of reality," honesty in rejecting facility, curiosity, intellectual unrest, and sincere engagement with one's subject: "I am afraid that our reporting has not yet achieved the necessary virtues—and for this reason it often discourages the writer as well as the reader."¹¹

The tendency of reporters to parrot the Party line or, conversely, to persist in "revisionist" querulousness evidently constitutes a major obstacle to the attainment of what, in the Party's opinion, would be a balanced but vigorous journalism. The editor of *Zycie Warszawy* has confirmed that failure to establish a middle ground between inane orthodoxy and flammable heresy was hampering development of the press: "Journalists are still in danger of falling into the old habit of mouthing official declarations and playing the passive part of copy writers because it is very convenient to do so. On the other hand, the danger of one-sidedness, gloomy views, incessant criticism, call it what you will, also exists in these present days of difficulties and complex problems . . . with which the journalist comes into contact more often than anyone else."¹²

The Yellow Press

A phenomenon of much concern to many critics in Poland has been the rise of yellow journalism, a trend connected with efforts to boost press circulation and to compensate for prohibitions on political controversy. One advocate of a "pure" Socialist press recently took exception both to the number of Catholic publications still existing in Poland and the high percentage of entertainment features in periodicals:

"There exist in the editorial offices of many publications, particularly of the 'entertainment' type, numerous myths and prejudices about the alleged incompatibility between the principles of education and the attraction of a magazine. This is particularly glaring in view of the fact that these very men are, at the same time, subject to thoughtless snobbery when it comes to the style of living and fashions in the West, without noting how greatly they disagree with the needs of our country. Under the mistaken slogan of a 'flight from didacticism' and a struggle for the attractiveness of publications, we recently have also had a great many miserably shameful tricks and . . . vulgarities, beginning with the divorces and maternities of film stars and ending with the 'problems' of onanism, impotence and the defloration of virgins."¹¹

Another article entitled "The Nauseating Press" condemned a different kind of gimmick used to boost circulation—the practice of running contests with thousands of prizes such as washing machines and TV sets. The author claimed that such methods were to no avail: "The next day, circulation again comes tumbling down. Because: 1. During the contest nobody thought of editing the paper more attractively and intelligently; and 2. This type of amusement-park journalism gains only temporary readers."

Turning to other sins of the press, the author of this article listed sloppiness, uniformity and superficiality as the major crimes. Like other critics in Poland, he maintained that improved reporting would be the best cure for present ills and attributed the decline of the literary-social publications to the fact that, in their few pages, they had a superabundance of commentaries and too little information: "The average reader is simply returning to the daily newspaper or the illustrated magazine for current information, entertainment and abridged reviews of the most important events of the day."

As for the quality of reporting, the author said that journalists were often shamed by the reactions of readers irritated by obvious mistakes and stupidities in the press. Readers also voice skepticism about information in the press because most newspapers in Poland are no bigger than pamphlets and all of them obtain their information from one source—the Polish Press Agency.

The monopolistic position of the Polish Press Agency does not aid the development of a wealth and variety of information. Let us, however, be frank: how many papers in Poland exploit the agency's service properly? Probably only *Trybuna Ludu* and *Zycie Warszawy*. And probably just because of this they are undoubtedly the best daily papers in the country. At the same time, in the entire provincial press the most essential information from abroad is very often replaced by a poor article or a description of some celebration. . . . [Furthermore] some journalists have a simplified view of the Party's role in the press. They understand the ideological and political inspiration of the Party, but unfortunately they extend this connection to the mechanism of editorial work. These simplifications lead to a loss of the sense of hierarchy and the readers' needs. . . .

"All the papers are alike, like twins, and this is one of their main sins. This is the result of lack of ambition and ability to edit a paper originally; it is the result of a lack



Montage of Polish newspapers for the press' 300th anniversary.
Prasa Polska (Warsaw), February 1961

of inventiveness. Almost all the provinces stare at the central [Warsaw] press and see nothing else. Everything that is 'new' in a provincial paper is more or less a successful imitation of *Zycie Warszawy* or *Trybuna Ludu*. And how often this 'contact' with the capital exhausts the extent of editorial [interest in all but local news]. . . . Too often it is forgotten that the interests of the people of Cracow, for instance, transcend the city and provincial borders. . . ."

Referring to the interests of Polish readers in general, the author of "The Nauseating Press" claimed that editors were wasting their energies on concentrating mainly on "entertainment." Poles, he claimed, were interested in the "problems of Socialist construction" and since the launching of the USSR's first earth satellite had wearied of the

HUMAN INTEREST

"Jacqueline Kennedy is an intelligent person quick to realize situations; above all, she will realize that she has ceased to be a private person and that every fact about her personal and family life, her health, her moods, her clothes and her whims will now be public property; she will have to be very careful of everything she does, every gesture, every move will not only be made known publicly but will be commented upon all over the U.S. . . . Thanks to photography, periodicals, radio and television, the face and silhouette of Jackie are known to people in the entire civilized world. I take on all bets that during the next four years, and with a bit of luck on Kennedy's part the next eight years, slim brunettes with large mouths and widely set eyes will be fashionable. Mrs. Kennedy likes to dress simply and modestly; simplicity in dress will therefore be the order of the day. Jackie is interested above all in literature, art, the theater and antiques; she is an amateur painter; she is of French origin, she studied in Paris, she knows foreign languages and she has travelled—she is actually a young American woman of the best kind without any particular superstitions; she is against discrimination against Negroes, she reads a great deal, she is quiet, has good taste and her own opinions. There will be numerous changes during her stay in the White House—she has already decided that this strange house furnished with stuffy old furniture accumulated by its successive inhabitants must be brought to order. Her guests will not be generals or golf experts but intellectuals, creative people of the pen and palette. . . ."

Swiat (Warsaw), March 26, 1961

"latest news tidbit from the West which for some time dominated the press." On the contrary, saturated "with news of faraway affairs and countries, they turned to problems closest to their own lives—that much more so, since they had become fascinating. . . . The readers wanted to know the mechanics of these economic, scientific and political 'miracles' occurring in the USSR—they began to wonder about the possibilities of bringing these occurrences to their own territory. Because, finally, it wasn't for nothing that for years we wrote about our common fate, the joint cooperation and the common goals of the Socialist coun-

tries. The reader is searching for explanations, comments and knowledge—concrete knowledge about these affairs which are elevating Socialist construction and which can elevate him."¹²

Dilemma

What precisely the Polish readers do want is, of course, open to investigation. According to *Nowa Kultura* the widespread claim in intellectual circles that Poles have reached a stage of "political indifference" is a myth. The periodical came to this conclusion on the basis of a survey conducted by the Experimental Psychology Department at Cracow University among selected readers in the provinces of Cracow, Katowice and Rzeszow. The poll found that 62.7 percent of the people interviewed listed ideological and political subjects as their third choice in reading matter; articles on scientific-technological subjects took first place and social affairs second. Specifically requested by the readers were: lively editorials on political events; more political articles; briefer articles; more controversial articles; fewer generalizations; fewer dreary reports on meetings, etc.; and more information about political life in other countries and less resort to oversimplified clichés.¹³

At the present time the Polish press evidently is incapable of satisfying many of the readers' demands both because of censorship and what seems to be a prevailing sense of discouragement in journalistic circles. While some reporters do believe that improvements can be made within the existing political situation and have pointed the road to such improvements, others see little possibility of compromise and few incentives in the profession. In the meantime, as always, it is the public that suffers most, although the situation as it now stands is dissatisfying for a variety of reasons to editors, writers and Party leaders as well.

SOURCES FOR THIS ARTICLE

- ¹ *PRASA POLSKA* (Warsaw), March 1960.
- ² *ZYCIE WARSZAWY* (Warsaw), January 30, 1961.
- ³ *PRASA POLSKA*, March 1961.
- ⁴ *PRASA POLSKA*, June 1960.
- ⁵ *EXPRESS WIECZORNY* (Warsaw), No. 124, 1959.
- ⁶ *NOWA KULTURA* (Warsaw), May 29, 1960.
- ⁷ *TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY* (Cracow), June 14, 1959.
- ⁸ *SZTANDAR MŁODYCH* (Warsaw), January 28-29, 1961.
- ⁹ *TRYBUNA LUDU* (Warsaw), January 29, 1961.
- ¹⁰ *NOWA KULTURA*, January 29, 1961.
- ¹¹ *NOWA KULTURA*, June 17, 1960.
- ¹² *ZYCIE LITERACKIE* (Cracow), June 26, 1960.
- ¹³ *NOWA KULTURA*, September 18, 1960.

PICTURES FROM BERLIN





**PICTURES FROM
BERLIN**

West Berliners, cut off from their relatives' 1
graves in East Berlin, throw wreaths
over the barrier.

West Berliners jeer East German border 2
guards patrolling the Potsdamer Platz
barbed-wire barricade.

A butcher shop in East Berlin as seen from 3
a West Berlin grocery before the
barricades were erected.

A rifle-toting grandmother marches with 4
comrades in recent parade of East
Berlin workers' militia.

East German troops supervise building 5
of cinder block wall to seal off the
Berlin escape route.

A defecting East German soldier leaps 6
a wire barricade into West Berlin at
Bernauer Str. border.

East German troops taking positions 7
a few feet in front of Berlin's
Brandenburg Gate.



3



5

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- (1) (7) German Information Center
(2) UPI
(3) (4) (5) (6) Wide World



THE TWO NEW CLASSES (*continued from page 6*)

avail: the experience of technology and science molds the mind toward Western rationalism. And as soon as an individual dares to apply this mode of thinking to the Marxist-Leninist faith, revisionism ensues.

Mr. Khrushchev recently launched a campaign for the technical and professional training of all Party workers: the only possible result will be the weakening of the monolithic faith of the ruling class. At the same time, the recruiting of students from the lower strata of society only widens the middle class, strengthening it, and the coupling of learning with factory work increases the coincidence of interest and understanding between the educated middle class and the physical laborers.

The Consumer Goods Issue

THE SECOND criterion distinguishing members of the ruling class from the new middle class consists in their attitude toward industrialization. While there is, in the agrarian nations, almost total agreement that heavy industry must be created as rapidly as possible, the new Communist rulers, as Djilas has shown, have a kind of obsession, or indeed a fanaticism, about heavy industry. This is comprehensible when we consider the intoxicating tradition of giant imperial power that exists in both Russia and China. As for the Moscow-trained revolutionaries in the satellite countries, they have adopted the style of their teachers. For the Romanian and other satellite ruling classes, there was only one imaginable choice: to build heavy industry at any cost, either a national industrial plant, as was attempted in Stalin's time, or specialized heavy industry complementary to the other states of the bloc (and mainly to Soviet heavy industry), as is happening now.

No one in Russia or in the satellite countries conceived of another form of industrial development. No one considered making industry fit national conditions, or thought of a balanced development that would include major consumer industries. The instincts of greatness and of imperial power, deep-rooted in the two great Eastern empires, demanded arms rather than bread. Only now, after many false starts and hesitations, are the Soviet leaders responding to the pressures of a popular demand for consumer goods. These demands do not come primarily from the peasant masses who still make up half the Russian population. Those masses can only anticipate another black period when they are to be pressed into the status of wage laborers. The pressures come rather from the urban population. Here again the "petty-bourgeois," the "trivial-materialistic" spirit of the new middle class, so often scoured by press and officialdom, has done its work.

It was no victory for the ruling class to accede to these demands, except insofar as political tensions may be relieved. The ruling class already enjoyed that higher standard of living now asked by the mass of the middle class; and the ruling class was able to enjoy its privilege without the need for major economic reforms. Only the middle class is so numerous that to bring about a measurable im-

provement in its living standard a major change in the industrialization program is required. There still is reason to expect the pendulum to swing back at least one more time; nevertheless the trend is visible to the naked eye in Russia, and the satellites will prudently follow.

Authority

THE POSSESSION of authority is also important in distinguishing a member of the ruling class from one of the middle class. I refer to the right to command, to have things done by others in both the state administration and in the national economy. There are, of course, instances in which the new ruling class has revealed a link, possibly through a kind of social unconscious, with the political methods of a distant and barbaric past. In 1958, for example, rather widespread embezzlement of public monies led the Romanian Party leadership to decree the death penalty for that crime. In a subsequent interview with an American newspaperman, published in *Scinteia* for the edification of potential embezzlers, Mr. Chivu Stoica, then Chairman of the Council of Ministers and member of the Politburo, eulogized the time of Vlad the Impaler when, as folklore has it, "you could leave your purse on the highway and no one would touch it." You could indeed, but the 15th century Walachian prince responsible for this state of public order was not only a cruel man but a sadist who delighted in watching the peculiar punishment which provided him with his nickname. No politician of Romania's former bourgeois regime would have dreamt of voicing such a comparison. Nor would any politician of the new middle class think of such a reference—if there were such a thing as a politician of the new middle class.

The use and abuse of national authority is a mark of the new ruling class, while it is characteristic of the new middle class—to say nothing of the dispossessed masses of laborers and farmers—that they lack any recognized and lawful authority. Political authority they have none, although managers, chief engineers, research chiefs or artistic directors have authority that is limited to the specific tasks assigned to them. It is the authority to have things done which you have been ordered to do by others. Very different is the unlimited authority of the Party workers, who



An apt Soviet version of the old adage: "Rank hath its privileges."
Krokodil (Moscow), April 30, 1961

may look into everything, ordering or rather "advising" any action that accords with the Party's general line.

The most striking difference between members of the two classes is that the manager, technical chief or foreman cannot order things done which he knows to be impractical or impossible. On the other hand, it is consistent with the methods of the ruling class to order the impossible, and to punish those charged with carrying it out. A sinister instance of this was provided in 1952 when the leading technicians of the Danube-Black Sea canal construction project were sentenced to death and executed for delays and "sabotage"; and afterwards the whole absurd scheme was dropped—like other such harebrained enterprises in other satellite countries—and the dead men were rehabilitated without anyone in the Party's leadership being held accountable for their deaths. The present purges in the higher officialdom of some Central Asian Soviet republics, as Professor Alec Nove has pointed out,* provide another example of the dilemma of functionaries trapped between unreasonable demands from above and the limits of possibility. This, much more than dishonesty, produces faked statistics and reports. It also casts considerable illumination on the relationship between oligarchy and subordinates in the Communist nations, between the absolute authority of the State owners and the middle class of executive state servants.

Intricate as the pyramid of hierarchy may be, the people's instinct seldom errs in distinguishing the real rulers from the technical and subordinate chieftains who are outside the ruling class. The Russian calls them by an old and traditional word, *nachalniki*. The East Germans use words coined under the Nazi bureaucracy: *Bonzen*, *Parteibonzen*. The Romanians have a word which appeared only under the present regime: *stabi*. It is noteworthy that while *nachalnik* is an emotionally harmless expression, as natural and matter-of-fact a word as the American "boss" (indeed with a respectful undertone which implies that the psychological tensions between rulers and ruled in Russia are far from being dangerous**), the contrary is true of *stabi* and *Bonzen*—and of reality in Romania and in the even shakier East German satellite.

Privilege

PRIVILEGE DISTINGUISHES the new ruling class from the middle class. Sometimes it is superficially observed that the line of demarcation between rulers and ruled in the Communist world is the use of a state-owned and chauffeur-driven car. But the "car mark" runs well below the real line dividing the classes. A factory or farm manager may enjoy the privilege without really "belonging," and the same is true of a scientist or a member of the Academy. The so-called "personal salary," a secret salary paid to certain top functionaries which may double their formal salary, is also quite often granted to medium-level execu-

ARISTOCRATS IN POLAND

A Polish journalist, Jerzy Urban, recently wrote an ironic sketch on the subject of "aristocratic throwbacks" among the younger generation. His observations, from which we print excerpts below, are particularly interesting in that they were made during a visit to the working-class town of Lodz.

"Barely have the old countesses begun to forget their ancestors who fought in the Battle of Vienna, and their former estates near Tarnopol, than their sons and grandsons—who previously did not even remember their high-born grandmothers—have begun to wear signet rings, speak with a pronounced 'ehr' and join the local horse club . . . August Maecenases have begun to turn the pages of their heraldry books while their sons stroll around carrying riding crops and making friends according to the following equation: six cylinders in a car are equal to six prongs in the ancestral crown. Until now, former cavalry captains were wont to boast of their coachman past, but now some coachmen have begun to boast of being former cavalry captains. And if you can't afford the supreme accomplishment of riding a live horse, at least you can wear a jockey's cap as you lead the Polonaise at the ball. White breeches and riding boots have begun to appear in the cafes, where they rank with the velvet slacks of movie directors. Several years ago, when doctors' wives summoned their maids by ringing a bell set in an amber frame, or held bridge parties every Thursday accompanied with tea and Paris fashion magazines, their sons—dressed in the regulation shirts of the Union of Polish Youth—looked on ironically from behind their dessert-laden plates. Today, these same sons dress in wash-and-wear shirts and hold Thursday evening bridge parties accompanied with tea and French journals. Private societies which require their prospective members to show credentials listing the number of cylinders in their cars, the number of prongs in their ancestral crowns, or the number of papa's scientific titles, have now been opened to shoemakers who sport Italian-style shoes. . . ."


Polityka (Warsaw), July 19, 1961

tives. Travel in the West, villas at vacation resorts, prizes are evenly distributed among *apparatchiks* and such distinguished "commoners" as writers, artists, scientists, technicians, highly productive workers, and Army officers.

But what the rulers have and no one else has is membership in the half-secret cooperative shopping centers, access to similar craft and repair shops, and the use of houses, cars, villas, clinics, physicians, and even servants attached to the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers or the Council of State. Here the goods and services are of the best quality available in the country and are afforded to the hierarchy at prices which multiply many times the income of the ruling class, and sometimes even at no cost at all. These cooks, chauffeurs and valets are state or Party

**The Listener* (London), July 13, 1961.

** Klaus Mehnert, *Der Sowjetmensch* (Frankfurt), 1961.



From Bucharest—a comment on white-collar subservience to bossism.
Urzica (Bucharest), March 15, 1961

employees. I knew a valet who was a lieutenant in the Secret Police, and I had a cook who had made the tour of the kitchens of the mighty in a status which a Westerner would describe as civil service.

The luxury thus available to the oligarchy—including the ancient hunting lodges and grounds of the royalty—provide approximately the living standard of the well-to-do Western middle class, with less freedom, less variety, and a constant danger of falling outside the privileged circle. In order to make sure that only genuine and current members of the oligarchy partake in privilege, the special goods and services system is always being reshuffled, reorganized, renamed and relocated, constantly sifting out those who have fallen from favor.

Middle-class privilege—if that is the name for their living standard—originates in published salaries and wages and in literary or artistic royalties which are widely advertised. Scientists, technicians, managers of important factories and high military officers, have comparatively gen-

erous salaries. But the highest-quality goods and services in the country are monopolized by the oligarchy, and a musician whose salary is five times that of a minister of state will nonetheless never attain the latter's standard of living. The living standard of the middle class is at best that enjoyed in the West by a skilled industrial worker, with certain luxuries common in the West—a private automobile, unlimited travel—quite out of reach.

These standards are, of course, relative and are subject to improvement. What is constant is the mechanism of secret privilege for the oligarchy, as opposed to the public—and therefore vulnerable—privilege for the new middle class. From time to time demagogic attacks are made by the leaders of the ruling class upon the *embourgeoisement* of managers, intellectuals, skilled workers and the like, with an eye to public opinion. In the same way, occasional school reforms tend to restrict the children of the new middle class from higher education in order to slow the growth of the middle class and to win the sympathy of the masses. The children of the oligarchy, on the other hand, manage to enter school as "workers'" sons. And among the Romanian *apparatchiks* one may discover newly recruited sons, nephews, brothers and wives of "distinguished Party workers." The process of caste-building seems internationally unrelenting.

The Political Outlook

HAVING SKETCHED the main features of the two new classes (although my description of privilege is based solely on the Romanian example, it being quite impossible for a foreigner, even one from a "fraternal socialist country" who is not a member of the inner circles of the oligarchy, to gain admission to the Holy of Holies of another state), I want to remark on the political outlook of the two classes.

Warlike imperialism obviously tends to accompany the primitive messianic psychology of the new oligarchy. Its roots are in the traditional imperialism of the old Russian and Chinese empires. One may add, however, that a great mass of population and organized power cannot be imagined as *not* having a tendency to thrust out beyond its frontiers—politically, economically and culturally. On the other hand, the trend toward welfare and material progress evident among the new middle class has already made itself felt in Soviet policies (although I would not want to say that it has triumphed, nor even that it will determine Russian policy in the near future). I believe that the Hungarian revolution was as much a revolt by the new middle class as it was a national rebellion, and so far as the Hungarian revolutionaries were able to state a foreign policy, it was a peaceful one; and the same is true of the Polish revisionists.

The attitudes of the two new classes in the satellite states toward the Soviet Union also serve to distinguish them. The ruling class invariably is so devoted to the USSR as to clash with the national interest. The expression which covers this is the "proletarian-internationalist" one: "What

is good for the USSR and strengthens it is, in the last analysis, good for us." This has, of course, served to justify a massive sell-out of the national interests of all the satellite states to the Bulwark of Socialism and Peace.

The middle class, on the other hand, so far as it dares to express political opinions, stands for national values and against Russian encroachments. The enthusiasm demonstrated by Bucharest audiences in 1959 when they attended a performance of the historical and patriotic—and rather xenophobic—drama, "Vlaicu-Voda," by Alexandru Davilla, which the government unthinkingly permitted to be staged on the centenary of the union of the Romanian principalities, provided an example of the intensity and breadth of repressed national feeling.

The Eastern societies are still very young, and their dynamics can be depended upon for another generation or two of steady development in the directions already described: away from the Marxist-Leninist meta-religion, or para-religion, and toward a more pragmatic mentality, toward some kind of welfare state, toward—but this is only the dimmest perspective—a gradual liberalization, or relaxation, of the existing political and social organization, and toward more blatant and entrenched private privilege.

The emergence of new social groups cannot be stopped, nor can their consciousness be molded other than by their technological environment—so, at least, Marx teaches, and in this case he may be right: to the misfortune of the Communist rulers. The trend of development leads toward an ever wider diffusion of Western intellectual attitudes among the steadily expanding middle class. The only allies

of the official doctrine are the most backward Russian masses. Among them, messianism, a mystical turn of mind, a fervent patriotism, even jingoism, still sustain the policies of the ruling class. Since social attitudes develop slowly we may wait another generation or more before industrialism finally transforms what we used to call "the Russian soul"—which is mainly the villagers' soul, be he Russian, Hindu, Chinese, Latin American, or Romanian.

The growth of the middle class is the most progressive and hopeful aspect of developments in the Communist societies. But its emergence as a confident political power is still many a decade, perhaps even a century, away. We have no radioactive carbon test, as we have for geological strata, with which to measure the development and rhythm of societies. If the regime established through the revolutionary reforms of Peter the Great around 1700 lasted two hundred years and mellowed only in its last half-century, if the modern French monarchy, organized after the wars of religion, fell two hundred years later, we cannot expect a much faster maturing or mellowing of the terrible new ruling classes—except, perhaps, as there may be a peaceful period of very great prosperity.

The more backward a country is, the less integrated and solid is its middle class. The forces of inertia in Russia and China are enormous, although industrialization cannot but have its effect. In that we may find hope, and also in the experience of Poland and Hungary where workers and intellectuals fought together in the first effort of the new middle class to assert a more free, a more tolerant, a more liberal, a more human society.

CONTRIBUTORS

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PETRU DUMITRIU's biography appears on page 4.

PAVEL CERVENY, who describes the consciousness of the "new socialist man," worked in several factories in Czechoslovakia.

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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

INTERNATIONAL: *Satellite leaders extol the CPSU Draft Program (p. 35).*

East Germans block access to West Berlin by their people, following an intensive propaganda drive (p. 34).

Bulgarian-Greek relations deteriorate (p. 47).

POLITICAL: *Polish Catholics criticize anti-Church bills (p. 38).*

Prague scrutinizes the National Committees (p. 41).

ECONOMIC: *Midyear plan reports published (p. 52).*

Bulgarians adopt currency reform (p. 48).

Romania announces wage raises, price cuts (p. 50).

AREAWIDE

The Berlin Crisis

The sealing of the border between East and West Berlin occurred in an unexpected fashion on August 13, after an announcement in effect that the Warsaw Pact nations had decided to shut off all traffic from east to west in order to "insure the security of the GDR" and to "put an end to the present abnormal situation in West Berlin."

The basis for this move was laid early in August, when the First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Warsaw Pact met in Moscow to discuss the question of a German peace treaty. According to the official communique published by the Soviet news agency, the Warsaw Pact nations "instructed competent bodies to insure the conclusion of the peace treaty and the observance of its provisions with respect to West Berlin and the sovereign rights of the GDR, including its rights on land, on water and in the air." (TASS [Moscow], August 5.)

The Propaganda Drive

The press and radio in most of the Soviet bloc have made much of the

Berlin issue, but without publicizing the grievances of the Ulbricht regime or emphasizing the flight of refugees from East Germany. Warsaw and Prague have limited themselves to insisting on the existence of two German states and on the need for a treaty "which would render impossible the kindling once again of warfare on the territory of Germany," and which would "serve the interests of the entire German nation." (Radio Prague and Radio Warsaw, August 7.)

The East German regime, on the other hand, has made a number of specific accusations against the "aggressive" government of the Federal Republic. These include charges that

- big West German trusts and Western intelligence agents are "manhunting" and "trafficking in human beings" by "luring East German citizens away from their homes";

- the Evangelical Church conference held in West Berlin on July 20 was an instrument of "Nazi policy";

- the migration of GDR citizens to West Germany is "nothing but a com-

ponent part of the cold war involving stealing, coercion, and kidnapping";

- the GDR has had to build resettlement homes for West Germans, "since the number of persons leaving West Germany is continually increasing";

- air traffic in West Berlin is a menace to human lives "and will have to be reorganized with representatives of that state [East Germany] which holds sovereignty in the air."

In August the East Germans dramatized their charges of "manhunting" by televising the trial of 5 men charged with "trafficking in human lives." Two of the men were sentenced to 15 years and 12 years of penal servitude respectively, and the others were given four-and-a-half to two years. The presiding judge said that "all the accused are guilty of having interfered with GDR construction and the right of its citizens to self-determination." (ADN [East Berlin], August 2.)

Reaction to Captive Nations Week

This year, as last, the Soviet bloc press raised a loud cry against the

designation of Captive Nations Week by the US Congress. One paper called it "an embarrassing spectacle jointly performed by Mississippi Senators, fugitive legionnaires, Cardinal Spellman, unemployed landowners, millionaire Rockefellers and venal scum." (*Romnia Libera* [Bucharest], July 26.)

Prague's broadcasts were particularly bitter and accused US policymakers of "wearing blinkers" and "not realizing that one-third of mankind does not care for American freedom." The radio said: "Has the United States forgotten South Korea, South Vietnam and the countries of Latin America where, on house walls and street corners, the world-famous 'Yankee go home' appears?" (Radio Prague, July 16.)

The CPSU Draft Program


Aware that the new CPSU Draft program published in Moscow on July 30 outlines the future for all of them, the satellite leaders, with the exception of the Albanians, went to great pains to emphasize the ideological importance of the document. The press hailed it as "a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis" and "a creative generalization" of the facts of history. One Prague newspaper, referring to the program as "a space ship to the future," said it was "an obligation for the Czechoslovak people to increase their share of work in realizing mutual international Communist goals." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], August 1.) The Bulgarians claimed that it "gives a clear and exhaustive answer to all questions" and that "the basic laws of the transition from capitalism to socialism contained in it are valid for every country." (*Trud* [Sofia], August 1.)

Articles on the program continued to appear in the press for a number of days, and radio broadcasts eulogized the Soviet Union and its people "for being the brain and conscience of the whole of mankind." Quite a number of reports also emphasized the peaceful aspects of the program. The Poles and Hungarians, particularly, talked of the "golden age of communism, peace and abundance" and added that

"the fulfillment of the program requires peace." (PAP [Warsaw], August 1, and *Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], August 2.)

East German officials underlined the promises made in the 20-year program, keeping their eyes averted from the economic problems that surrounded them. Boasting of the ability of the Communists to make long-range plans, one broadcast asked: "How could a bourgeois party ever succeed in making plans, even if it held power? Can Kennedy's, Macmillan's or Adenauer's parties say today what will happen in 40 years' time? The mere thought makes you laugh. Only the Communists can do this, and that is why friends and foes of our social order look with such joyful expectation or anxiety toward tomorrow." (Radio East Berlin, July 29.)

As might have been expected, the Yugoslavs virtually ignored the document, devoting only half a column to it in the party weekly and burying the story in the daily press. Along with one brief summary went the comment that the program offered nothing new in its "appraisal of what has become known as the socialist camp or what is being described as the forces of socialism in the world and identified



A Romanian press view of the West German election campaign: "The position of Adenauer and the opposition of Brandt."

Romnia Libera (Bucharest), July 23, 1961

with the camp." Complaining that Yugoslav policies had been attacked, one article added: "The program tries to legalize the firmly established camp of socialist countries and even gives itself the right to speak for socialism and new forms of human society." The article further claimed that "the program did not pay much attention to the historical side of the matter. The socialist camp does not exhaust socialism in the world, nor is the attachment to a bloc or camp the only measure of socialism." (*Politika* [Belgrade], August 1.)

Nkrumah in Eastern Europe

President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, accompanied by a staff of economic and technical advisers, recently completed a long tour that took him from Moscow through each satellite capital to Peiping, and finally on to Yugoslavia for the neutralist conference. Along the way he made a series of economic, technical and educational agreements, including one with Poland for "a considerable number of scholarships for Ghanaian students at Polish higher educational establishments." (PAP [Warsaw], July 28.)

In response to the red-carpet treatment offered him everywhere, and the

florid toasts to the "great people of Ghana," Nkrumah was cordial but guarded. In Prague he declared that he was "anxious to see the great progress you have made in your industrial, technological and scientific development. That you have been able to achieve so much is naturally of the greatest interest," he added, "since we in Africa are engaged in a complex struggle to raise the standard of living of our people." (Radio Prague, July 31.)

In Poland, however, where discussions centered around international problems, there was pressure for Nkrumah's support on West Berlin. The Poles took great care to invite the attention of their visitor to "the fact that the lack of a peace treaty with Germany constitutes a permanent source of tension in Europe." The Ghanaian leader refused to commit himself. According to the communique, "the Government of Ghana took note of this attitude and expressed its appreciative understanding of Poland's position." (Radio Warsaw, July 29.)

In East Berlin a few days later, Nkrumah spelled out his position as a neutralist. Thanking the faculty of Humboldt University for an honorary degree, he told his audience that Ghana wants "trade, not aid, but this presupposes that we must all fight for a peaceful atmosphere so that normal trading relations may develop. Our main purpose is to raise the standard of living for our people and we are going to do that with the aid of all

our friends in the world." (Radio East Berlin, August 1.)

World Youth Forum

The East European press and radio gave much publicity to a "World Youth Forum" called by the Soviet Young Communist League on July 25 in Moscow. The meeting was said to have been attended by 700 young people representing 350 youth organizations in 91 countries. (Radio Budapest, Radio Prague, Radio Warsaw, July 29.)

The central topic of the four-day discussion meeting was "Youth and Disarmament." The threnody against West German militarism, NATO, colonialism and the enemies of peaceful coexistence was interrupted only a few times. A Polish representative criticized a Belgian delegate for "telling lies about the attitude of the Communists, the labor movement and the struggle of the socialist countries for peace," and a British delegate was said to have announced that he could not endorse the "memorandum of solidarity with the Tunisian people." (TASS [Moscow], July 26.)

The Soviet bloc leaders, along with Yugoslavia's Tito, sent cordial greetings to the conference. Tito counselled: "It is your historic duty to make your greatest contribution to the safeguarding of peace and progress by striving for acceptance of the policy and practice of active and peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems." (Radio Belgrade, July 24.)

EAST GERMANY (THE GDR)

Insulating the Economy

The erection of a barbed-wire curtain between East and West Berlin on August 13 was only one of the measures taken by the Ulbricht regime to insulate East Germany from the West. The soldiers were able to stem the flow of refugees, but the Pankow officials faced a still more difficult task: that of insulating the economy of the GDR from its "vulnerable dependence upon West German deliveries."

In mid-July East German propa-

ganda media were already stressing that the citizens of the GDR would have to prepare themselves for sacrifices in a long-range effort to make the economy independent of the West. "Stepping up the development of certain branches of basic industries and establishing closer economic relations with the USSR are tasks as essential as the conclusion of a peace treaty. The difficulties in the production of consumer goods caused by this economic reorganization must be charged to the extremists in Bonn." Such was

the East Berlin radio's view of the matter on July 13, and on the following day it continued in the same vein. A major shift in capital investment was necessary, it said. "We could, of course, import sheet metal to make refrigerators, washing machines and motor cars. But the material would be quickly used up. In the long run it would not help us very much. It is therefore a far-sighted decision of the Party leadership and of our government that we make a special effort now to lay the foundations for becoming independent, once and for all, of imports from the West." All of these problems must be frankly faced, the radio continued, "including the fact that extensive switches and arrangements not foreseen in the plan may lead to temporary difficulties . . . which may be felt in the market. But what must be, must be."

The new program was formally announced at the 13th plenary session of the Central Committee early in July, and the press and radio have echoed it ever since, playing down the shortages of foodstuffs and other consumer goods and emphasizing the sacrifices which must be made for peace. Politburo member Erich Honecker argued that the basic need was to insure adequate supplies of raw material through greater investment at home, as well as through increased imports from the Soviet Union and other Soviet-bloc countries, especially of steel and other metals and basic chemical materials.

As for consumer goods, Honecker admitted that there were shortages—as the press has not always done.

"We must make clear among all strata of our population that a profound improvement in the supply of textiles is only possible in the long run through a comprehensive development of the production of synthetic fibers, and that therefore we must now and in the forthcoming year invest large sums in this and similar branches of the economy."

Possibilities of increased imports, he said, were exhausted. He conceded that there had been shortfalls in numerous categories of industry, construction and agriculture, which had had "adverse effects on supplies to

the population." Moreover, the situation was not helped by inflationary pressures stemming from a greater increase in purchasing power than planned.

Honecker made the usual exhortations: to management for better organization, to the workers for greater productivity, and to the peasantry to desist from demanding an eight-hour day. He even took a "liberal" line

on private retail enterprises which provide the population with a good deal of their goods and services. He called for an end to discrimination against these enterprises in the allocation of raw materials, and criticized "sectarian measures such as the deliberate closing of private bakeries, butcher shops and restaurants." (*Neues Deutschland* [East Berlin], July 9.)

POLAND

Gomulka in Katowice


The 17th anniversary of the "birth of People's Poland" was celebrated all over Poland on July 22, but the major event was at Katowice in Silesia where Party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka treated his audience to a long speech that touched on a wide range of topics. Observing that Poland "has been engaged in building a new nation through the toil of the working class, through the toil of all working peo-

ple," Gomulka praised the Silesians for their sacrifices, asked for greater production at lower cost, promised a four-fold increase in national income by 1980, and echoed Soviet Premier Khrushchev's demand for a German peace treaty and the disbanding of NATO.

He also extended a special greeting to Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, whose presence in Katowice evoked wide interest and provided the Polish

The Polish delegation headed by Party chief Gomulka and Premier Cyrankiewicz shown touring the countryside outside Ulan Bator, Outer Mongolia, during their visit to the Party Congress in July.

Swiat (Warsaw), July 23, 1961



Party leader with an opportunity to praise the "glory of socialist science, technology and industry."

Speaking of Poland's economic development plans and with obvious reference to the new Soviet twenty-year plan, Gomulka added: "We must look ahead and consider the tasks of the present five-year plan as part of a wider plan of the country's development. We are not yet ready in every respect to discuss in detail the directives of a long-term plan for the next twenty years, but such a plan is being worked out in consultation with the fraternal socialist countries to provide for mutual trade exchanges, specialization and international division of labor."

After the usual blasts against "West German militarism," the Polish Party chief modulated his tone on the Berlin issue. "Common sense," he said, "leads us to surmise that the policy of the NATO states will in the end be influenced by realism and a sober view of the situation. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries have clearly stated their readiness to negotiate the problem of a peace treaty and of West Berlin and to examine all specific proposals on these matters." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], July 23.)

Party Membership Rises

A mid-year report on Communist Party membership claims that in the past six months the number of Polish Party members has increased by about 10 percent. The report stated: "Party organizations in all parts of Poland admitted a total of 127,241 candidates in the first six months of this year. After taking into account all changes—new admissions, restorations of membership rights, expulsions and deaths—the membership of the Party increased during this period by 114,863 and reached a total of 1,269,340 (not counting Party members serving in the Army)." (PAP [Warsaw], July 18.)

1962 Plan Revised Upwards

Encouraged by the rapid growth of industrial output so far this year, the Council of Ministers announced an upward revision of production targets



A Polish comment on the native uprisings in Portuguese Angola.

Polityka (Warsaw), June 24, 1961

in 1962 for some key materials crucial to the development of Polish industry, principally coal, steel and cement. At the same time, the planned output will be backed up by investment outlays 3 billion *zloty* larger than originally slated, which brings the year's total to 118 billion (565 billion have been earmarked for the 1961-65 period).

The revised Plan stipulates 1.3 million metric tons more coal and 290,000 metric tons more steel than previously called for. Past performance and future goals are as follows (in million tons):

	1962		1965
	1960	New	Plan
	Achieved	Plan	Plan
Coal	104.4	109	113.6
Steel	6.7	7.75	9.3
Cement	6.6	7.4	11.1

Judging from the relative magnitudes involved, these new targets may signal a corresponding increase in the 1965 goals.

In addition, there is to be a "substantial" increase in the output of

consumer goods. Retail sales in the coming year are expected to be more than 5 million *zloty* in excess of the figure originally anticipated. The revised version of the Plan earmarks 18 percent more funds for housing construction—despite the cutback last year in planned outlays for this purpose during 1961-65—and 44,000 more dwelling rooms will be built in 1962 than were first planned.

In the investment plan, the chief alteration is the increased outlay for the purchase of machinery and installations. The mining and power industries are to receive the largest investment funds, 15.7 billion *zloty*. Heavy industry is to get 13.3 billion, chemicals 9 billion, housing construction and building materials 5.4 billion, and light industry 2.6 billion. (PAP, July 18, 29.)

Two Anti-Church Bills

Although Poland abandoned religious education in public school classrooms two years ago, a bill passed by the Sejm on July 15 makes it officially forbidden. This section of the omnibus educational reform bill, however, raised several eloquent objections by five Catholic deputies of the "Znak" group in the parliament, who abstained from voting on the entire bill.

Andrzej Werblan, the Communist Party's educational director, in presenting the bill to parliament made it clear that his concept of a secular-scientific education was thoroughly Marxist. Catholic deputy Mazowiecki, in an impassioned speech, insisted that the truly secular school must not impose a single doctrine on the students. "Catholic parents," he said, "cannot allow their children to be educated in the spirit of dialectic materialism and do not want to raise their children to be materialists. We object also that such a legal determination of the educational goals of the school system is not in accordance with the demands presented by today's pluralistic society."

Mazowiecki regretted that the "Znak" deputies were unable to vote for the bill, since the other sections provided for needed reforms—the extension of grammar school education from 7 to 8 years, and changes in the

curricula of vocational schools. In addition, he asked for a government guaranty that private Catholic schools in Poland "may continue their great humanitarian tradition" and quoted Party chief Gomulka as saying in 1956: "It is a poor idea to think that only the Communists and atheists can build socialism." (*Tygodnik Pow-szechny* [Warsaw], July 30.)

The Sejm closed its session with the passing of still another bill aimed at reducing the legal position of the Catholic Church. This was a law giving the state ownership of all corporate properties, including church property, in the territories taken from Germany after World War II. Controversy over ownership rights to this real estate and to the 3000 churches, parish houses, seminaries and hospitals included in it has been raging for years. Once again the five Catholic deputies protested, but their negative votes had no effect. (*Tygodnik Pow-szechny*, July 30.)

State Farms in the Black?

For the first time in their history, the country's state farms ended the fiscal year on June 30 with an overall profit—according to current government accounting methods. Radio Warsaw said on August 3 that the state farms, which own about 12 percent of Poland's arable land (collective farms have only about 1.2 percent, and most of the rest is cultivated by private farmers), moved into the black with a surplus of about 300 million *zloty* during the 1960-61 period: seven out of ten of them were profitable as compared with only half of them in the preceding year. They supplied more than one quarter of the grain and a similar share of the milk deliveries, and the increase of their total output during the year was twice that of private farms.

However, an article in the country's leading economic weekly *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), on July 16, selected its facts more judiciously. Its analysis gave a clearer—if not so rosy—picture of financial affairs in the state farms. While the author viewed last year's successes as something of an historic event, he was not so sure that the profits obtained were

really profits. The core of his argument was that current accounting methods used by the farms do not correspond to reality.

"If one were to introduce a normal payment for depreciation by the state farms, and withdraw their unjustified subsidies from the budget, it would appear that the state farms as a whole will be a deficit enterprise until the

end of the present Five Year Plan [i.e., until 1965—Ed.]."

The state farms are now receiving subsidies of about 3,000 million *zloty* annually from the state budget, the author said; in consequence—since the subsidies are evidently treated as income—profit and loss statements "do not represent the real level of the costs of production."

* * * *

THERE ISN'T ANY

A Polish poet, Włodzimierz Borunski, deplores the constant shortage of the basic necessities of life—from *Kurier Polski*, June 17-18, 1961.

This devilish phrase has

Tormented the man in the street for quite some time now. . . .

*At times I control my anger,
but at times I grow furious.*

*Tired, panting like a dog,
I run from shop to shop.*

*I hardly have time to ask: "Have you . . . ?"
When I hear the answer: "There isn't any."*

*"There isn't any" sounds sternly
on the lips of the shop assistant.
And if only it were a luxury item
which is in short supply! But it is
a basic necessity which has disappeared.*

*The goods were there, for a day or two,
but because the people liked them,
someone has seen to it that
they should not be available . . .*

damn it!

*That is why I ran to and fro, sweating
in shops. I feel embarrassed
lest again I hear the phrase:
"There isn't any!"*

"There isn't any!"

"There isn't any!"

*And only at the time when I'm asleep,
(Vengeance is the delight of the gods!)
I dream sweetly that they come,
they stand at the threshold,
those who created this evil:
the planners, distributors, and others,
God knows who. Those important people, those directors.
Each one is shaking like a coward.
Each one blames the other—
and I have a knife in my hand—
and intend to stab every one of them!
"Have mercy!"—they cry—"it's a joke!
Why are your eyes so furious?
Have mercy!"*

*And I answer with a devilish laugh
and I tell them:*

"There isn't any!"

As for production in the state farms, the facts cited by the writer were less impressive than the government had claimed. While the country's total agricultural production increased during the 1956-60 period by roughly 20 percent, the rise in output on state farms was only 10.3 percent. Moreover, compared with state farms in other countries, those in Poland were lagging significantly. In 1959, wheat yields were about half those obtained in East Germany and 27 percent below those of Czechoslovak state farms; in other crops the situation was similar, and cattle breeding was in even worse shape. The recent accounting successes were attributable in part to increased prices for the state farms' produce, increased subsidies, lower interest rates for bank credits and reduced insurance rates.

Nevertheless, the writer expected better performance from the state farms during the years 1961-65, when the pace of agricultural development is slated to increase in the various sectors as follows (in percentages):

	Private Farms	Total Farms	Farms
Global production . . .	22.2	20.6	38.7
Plant . . .	16.5	15.3	27.6
Animal . . .	30.9	28.4	66.1

Spy Trial in Warsaw

A young Polish woman named Wanda Nowicka has been convicted of working for an American intelligence service and sentenced to three years in prison. According to the Polish press, Miss Nowicka made contact with an American spy in Copenhagen where she had gone on vacation in 1958 and was paid for her services. (PAP [Warsaw], July 24.)

Poles Cancel Albanian Tours

Polish-Albanian relations have recently been at a low ebb. Each country has recalled its ambassador, and in mid-July Orbis, the official Polish travel agency, cancelled all holiday tours to Albania for the summer. (*The New York Times*, July 19.)

Although the number of Polish visitors to Albania had always been small,

the Polish government sent an Orbis permanent representative to Tirana in April to facilitate more tours to the area. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], April 27.) This was about the time of a new worsening in relations between the two countries; Radio Tirana announced that the Polish ambassador had left the country on April 1, and since then no replacement has been made. The Albanian representative to Warsaw was declared persona non grata by the Poles last October for assaulting a Polish citizen. (*Muenchner Merkur* [Munich], October 12.)

Import Negotiators Jailed

The definition of "economic crimes" has been stretched to the limit in an intensive drive to root out abuses of socialist property. "Official neglect" brought two high-ranking persons in the shipping industry—Marian Gronowicz, former Director of the Central Board of Merchant Marine Transport, and Włodzimierz Moderow, Deputy Director for Administrative and Financial Affairs of the Polish Ocean Lines—sentences of five and three-and-a-half years respectively on July 24.

The defendants, who were responsible for purchasing ships abroad, were found guilty of failing to analyze tonnage prices on world markets and making incorrect calculations which led to "unfavorable import agreements." The two were said to have shown "negligence in organizing proper technical inspection of ships received so that ships were bought at inflated prices." (Radio Warsaw, July 24.) Since the shipping officials evidently neither stole, embezzled nor expropriated anything—the usual crimes of economic offenders—their sentences suggest that the regime is preparing to wield a heavy stick against any action working to the detriment of the economy.

Less unusual circumstances prevailed in another case of economic crime reported the following day. The five principal defendants in a stolen automobile-parts racket at the car-body building works in Nysa received sentences ranging from 8 to 12 years in prison; and their accomplices were issued 6-year jail terms

and 30,000 *zloty* fines. The convicted men were said to have stolen automobile parts valued at about a quarter million *zloty*. (Radio Warsaw, July 25.)

Unemployed Women Increase

Polish officials have expressed concern at the increase in the number of women who complain that they cannot find jobs. According to one radio broadcast, the problem is complicated by the fact that "80 percent of the women looking for jobs have no professional skills," and by the "unwillingness of many employers to hire women." Studies of employment policies in 13 large production areas also indicate that "out of every 100 posts vacated by men no female replacements were hired, while 30 percent of every 100 posts vacated by women were re-staffed by men." The radio warned that "although the figure of 30,000 unemployed women is not bad compared to the 2 million women now employed, such a state of affairs must not be disregarded since many of these women have to work in order to support their families." (Radio Warsaw, July 16.)

First Workers' Court

The institution of Workers' Courts, in use for several years in most countries of the Soviet bloc, has recently been introduced in Poland. The first two trials were given extensive coverage in the press even though the offenses were minor. While there have been countless editorials on the subject of pilferage, which is said to run into millions of *zloty*, the two cases under trial involved damages estimated at less than 100 *zloty*. The trials, which took place in the Passenger Car Factory at Zeran, were reported as follows:

"An employee in the Central Power Department was accused of stealing a pair of working gloves, valued at 78 *zloty*. The accused explained that he didn't want to steal the gloves, only borrow them to protect his hands while cleaning his cellar. His sentence: a reprimand and an adverse note placed in his dossier."

"The second defendant, a worker from the Chief Mechanic's department,

was accused of stealing a small piece of automobile upholstery fabric, valued at 28 *zloty*. The defendant explained that he believed this material to be of no use to anyone and took it to shine his shoes. The verdict: loss of bonus privileges for one year." (*Glos Pracy* [Warsaw] July 12.)


College Entrance Problems

Newspapers in Warsaw devoted considerable attention last month to college entrance examinations and the overcrowded conditions in universities, which turned half of the high school graduates away from their doors. One paper gave the number of rejected students as over 20,000. (*Zycie Warszawy* [Warsaw], June 30.)

The greatest number of candidates were accepted in law, philology, mathematics and physics. Warsaw Polytechnic accepted 2,100, but 1,200 applicants failed their polytechnic exams and another 150 were turned away for lack of space. There was also an excess of applicants for advanced study in foreign trade, agricultural technology and Mediterranean archeology. (*Slowo Powszechnne* [Warsaw], July 19.)

New Chief of Light Industry

The appointment of Włodzimierz Lechowicz to the post of chairman of



A satire on Polish bureaucracy.

Szpilki (Warsaw), July 30, 1961

Poland's Light Industry Committee gives the small Polish Democratic Party its second member on the Council of Ministers and also serves to rehabilitate a man who spent eight years in jail before 1956. Lechowicz replaces Adam Zebrowski who had earlier been named Chairman of the Bank of Poland. (*Kurier Polski* [Warsaw], July 16.)

The new minister, who will have virtually no influence over political decisions since he is directly responsible to a Communist Minister, has been a Sejm deputy for the Polish Democratic Party and has a long record of patriotic service. A graduate of the University of Warsaw, he worked for the Home Army during the Nazi occupation and fought in the Warsaw Uprising. He was Minister of Food and Supplies before his imprisonment and since 1956 has been editor-in-chief of the daily *Kurier Polski*. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], July 16.)

The Housing Squeeze

Some residents of Warsaw could not have been very happy to learn what the government intends to do about the city's chronic housing shortage. Last spring the Party Central Committee declared that it would take action in spite of the lack of funds for construction and repairs. Finally, in July, Deputy Minister Janusz Wieczorek made public a government plan to reallocate the available living space.

In an interview with the press, Wieczorek explained that "the living space allocated to each individual will have to be reduced from the previous 9 square meters per person to a maximum of 7 square meters." With regard to housing assignments, he also added that "it will be within the authority of the housing department to evaluate each applicant's housing requirements according to his professional work and social attitude." (*Sztandar Młodych* [Warsaw], July 7.)

or two men. Prague's trade union paper confirmed this situation and further added that the people had lost confidence in the National Committees, judging from the number of complaints and petitions that were "pouring into the Central Trade Union Council, the Presidium of the National Assembly and the Office of the President of the Republic." (*Prace* [Prague], July 4.)

New US Ambassador in Prague

The new US ambassador to Czechoslovakia, E. T. Wailes, presented his credentials to President Antonin Novotny in Prague on July 28, but his reception could hardly be called warm. Speaking of the long tradition of friendship and common interests between the two nations, Wailes expressed the hope that he would be able to help find a way to eliminate some of the causes of tension. President Novotny's reply was diplomatic but rather abrupt. Iterating his friendly feelings for the people of the United States, he remarked: "We have always been for peaceful understanding, but when it was necessary we defended and will continue to defend our national state and social rights. We want peace but we are on our guard when we hear again, as we have heard in the past, aggressive revanchist voices in West Germany." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], July 29.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A Look at the National Committees

The appointment of Rudolf Barak as Chairman of the Commission for National Committees (*East Europe*, August, p. 37) promises to be a most important assignment. Following the announcement of Barak's appointment, some of the functions of the Ministry of the Interior which he formerly headed were added to the Commission's new Central Office, which had been established by supplementary legislation. According to press reports, the new responsibilities include "the territorial division of the state, the protection of socialist order, control of all voluntary organizations and assemblies, birth and death registers and preparations for elections." (*Praca* [Bratislava], July 23.)

The Commission held its constituent meeting on July 20 and directed its attention chiefly to the district National Committees, which were described as the "main element in the direction of the national economy" (CTK [Prague], July 21). However, there

had already been a wave of press criticism of all the National Committees, regional, district and local, for their failure to implement the new constitution of July 1960, as well as their ignoring of the Party and government directives on the decentralization of executive power. *Rude Pravo*, the official organ of the Communist Party, accused them of poor administration, saying that "the chairmen of the regional Committees have promised that deficits in the bulk purchases of agricultural produce would be made up, but these were empty promises based on ignorance of the real situation, particularly in agriculture. In the same manner, chairmen of the district Committees make vain promises to the regional Committees and the local Committees make promises to the district Committees." (July 7.) The same paper, on July 18, leveled another attack at the National Committees, accusing them all of a lack of interest in their work. Many members, it said, did not attend meetings, with the result that authority often resided in one

Prague Hints Air Sabotage

Newspapers and radio broadcasts last month began a campaign to lay the blame for the two recent Czechoslovak Airlines crashes on Western saboteurs. Noting that both accidents, that of March 28 near Nuremberg and that of July 12 near Casablanca, occurred on the Prague-Bamako route, that both planes were Soviet-built IL-18s "known for their dependability," and that both crashes took place near American military bases, the Prague regime "seriously doubted that this could have been a disaster caused by technical factors." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], July 23.)

A Prague radio report a few days later quoted the Moroccan paper *Al-Maghrib Al-Arabi* as saying that "the majority of Moroccans think that the

Western capitalist countries were not enthusiastic over the end of their monopoly on air connections with the African mainland" and that "it is not difficult to see who is responsible for this disaster." (Radio Prague [Home Service], July 29.)

However, the Prague broadcasts in English omitted the *Al-Maghrib Al-Arabi* commentary, criticizing instead "the uncooperative attitude of the French investigating authorities" and "the unclear role played by the nearby US air base which could have given facilities to the Czechoslovak airliner as it has done for Western civil airlines in case of need." (Radio Prague, July 28.)

The commentators insisted that in each case the technical perfection of the plane and the training of the crew "ruled out the possibility of a mysteri-

ous accident" and that "the crashes must be viewed as suspicious." (CTK, Prague, July 29.)

Abortions Increase

The number of legal abortions performed in state clinics is on the rise, according to the Czechoslovak Health Service. A report published in the June issue of *Ceskoslovenske Zdravotnictvi* stated that "the percentage of artificial interruptions of pregnancy is increasing while the number of spontaneous abortions is decreasing." In the country as a whole the number of abortions was half the figure for live births. In the Czech lands the figure was 65.6 percent, while for Slovakia it was 32.9 percent. In Prague, according to the study, there were 116.3 abortions for every 100 births. One

newspaper has reported that several other cities, including Brno and Bratislava, registered more abortions than live births. (Prace [Prague], July 21.)

Safety in the Mines

The mine disaster at Ostrava in July (see *East Europe*, August p. 39) which was followed by a heroes' funeral for the 108 victims, continued to be a *cause celebre* in the Party press. On July 30 *Rude Pravo* editorialized that "the latest disaster in the Dukla mine draws our attention to the fact that similar accidents and disasters which could have been prevented have been occurring too often."

The paper cited two other accidents in the Hlubina mine and the Nejedly mine, as well as a train collision near Steblová, which were "by and large

VACLAV KOPECKY

The sudden death on August 5 of Vaclav Kopecky, a Deputy Premier and Politburo member, deprived the Czechoslovak political scene of one of its few colorful personalities. Though he had lost much of his influence in Party circles in recent years, Kopecky retained a certain measure of power from his standing as a close friend of the late President Klement Gottwald and from his heritage as an "old Bolshevik," dating from 1921 when he split from the Social Democrats to become one of the founders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

Born in 1897 in a small town outside of Prague, he may have inherited from his great grandfather, a puppeteer, the theatrical qualities which prevented him from ever being taken quite seriously by his colleagues. After he joined the Party, Kopecky made his living as an editor of Communist publications until he was finally appointed editor-in-chief of the official Party organ *Rude Pravo* in 1929. In that year he was also elected to the Czechoslovak parliament. Throughout the decade of the thirties Kopecky wisely sided with Gottwald in the internal rivalries which beset the Party; in 1938 he accompanied the future President to the USSR, where he re-

mained during World War II.

When Czechoslovakia was liberated from the Nazis, Kopecky received the important post of Minister of Information in the first postwar government. This position enabled him to



The late Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Vaclav Kopecky (the bald-headed man in the foreground) at a Party rally last spring.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), May 13, 1961

control the press and radio during the period preceding the coup of 1948. At one time Kopecky made several virulent anti-Semitic statements which highly embarrassed the Party. Later

he played a leading role in the purges of Communists of Jewish origin, culminating in the trial of Rudolf Slansky in 1952. Kopecky reached the highest level of the Party hierarchy with his election, after Slansky's arrest, to the eight-member Party Secretariat. Within the government itself he was promoted to Deputy Premier in 1953; in September of that year he took over the new Ministry of Culture, becoming in effect the chief of propaganda and indoctrination.

After Gottwald's death in 1953, Kopecky began to lose his influence. He was dismissed from the Ministry of Culture and was never again given an important governmental post, though he retained a leading position in the Party as a member of the Politburo. He was supplanted as Party ideologist by Jiri Hendrych.

Personally, Kopecky was an amusing *bon vivant* who liked to play cards and drink and remained on good terms with most of his colleagues. These amiable qualities, however, did not prevent him from holding fast to the strong Czechoslovak Party line until his death. He was dedicated to the Soviet Union, fervently devoted to Gottwald and resolutely opposed any relaxation of Party control over the population.

brought about by the decline of discipline, responsibility and vigilance of the respective organs in the execution of their duties." Radio Prague stated on July 30 that an official commission had been set up to investigate the safety installations and equipment in all mines, and that the trade union organization had been warned that it may have to take the blame. The broadcast explained: "The Revolutionary Trade Union Movement must launch a resolute struggle for the safety of work. Its organs and officials must demand concrete improvement in every case where the management has not insured proper working and safety conditions."

Border Guard Defects

A young lieutenant in the Czechoslovak Border Guards arrived in Vienna on August 7, surrendered his side-arms and asked for political asylum. Dressed in civilian clothes, he indicated that he planned to contact his wife and child, who were to escape along a different route, in Nuremberg. His last duty post, according to the report, was in the Bratislava area. He entered Austria near Engerau. (*Die Presse* [Vienna], August 9.)

Koreans and Vietnamese in Prague

An official delegation from North Vietnam, headed by Premier Pham van Dong, completed a 12-day visit to Prague on July 17, a few days after the arrival of still another official delegation from North Korea headed by Vice Premier Yi Chu-yon. Trade and aid were high on the list of discussion topics with both groups, and joint statements on the necessity to "disband SEATO, eliminate the ultramilitarist cliques in South Vietnam, South Korea, and Laos and liberate Taiwan" were issued. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], July 19, 20.)

The North Korean delegation spent comparatively more time on "economic cooperation" talks than did the North Vietnamese. According to one report, the CSSR and the KPDR signed a protocol calling for "further economic cooperation during 1961-65, especially in the mining and proc-

A CAR OR A CHILD

The increasing number of medical abortions in Czechoslovakia was the subject of the following discussion in Smena (Bratislava), the Slovak Youth League organ, on July 27, 1961:

Although it may sound preposterous at first, there are some families who think: which shall we choose, a car or a child? And the decision is—a car. After all, with a child you have worries, the mother is practically bound to the house. A car is something else again, it takes you out anytime you want. What is modern life without a car? And if a baby unexpectedly announces its arrival? Well, why make problems? In hospitals they know what to do about it—and free of charge!

Some young couples think this way. They don't worry whether it will be a boy or a girl, a Renault or a Skoda Octavia. A car fever seizes them. Demand for cars is rising every year. Last year, in 1960, one hundred thousand citizens of our country applied for cars. Certainly, this is good evidence of interest and of the fact that people are not badly off. However, last year several scores of thousands of women also applied for abortions. In 1960 one hundred thousand such applications were approved!

Since 1957, the year when the law on abortion became effective, the number of applications has been increasing. In some cases the reasons are justified. At the same time it is a fact that we have cities like Bratislava, Brno, Prague, Decin, Most, and others where there are more abortions (officially approved) than new-born babies. And it is a serious matter that applications are filed mostly by women without children or with only one child. This is a grave problem from still another point of view: Czechoslovakia has today the lowest birthrate among 26 of the most important countries in the world. In 1959 only 16 children were born for every 1,000 inhabitants. Even France, once known for its low birthrate, is far better off in this respect than our republic.

essing of copper deposits in North Korea." (*Rude Pravo*, July 20.)

Fuel-Saving Drive Launched

A nation-wide campaign "to save at least one percent of the planned consumption of fuel and power this year" was touched off at a national conference of economic and trade union leaders on July 18. Politburo member Jaromir Dolansky called for improved technical equipment and stiffer fuel consumption norms in the country's factories, power stations and transportation enterprises.

The campaign is described as "correct husbandry" rather than as an emergency measure. However, it follows upon a crisis in the Ostrava-Karvina coal basin, which has not been fulfilling its production plans. The mines in that region, which are

the most important source of the country's fuel supply, have been plagued by serious labor shortages, absenteeism and poor management. (*Rude Pravo*, July 27.)

Polytechnical Training Criticized

The practice of putting untrained college and university students into factory jobs for "work experience" has apparently created more problems than it has solved. At the end of July Professor V. Kristek, First Deputy Minister of Education and Culture, announced a new reorganization "to establish closer ties between the schools and the life of the people of all colleges and universities," and called attention to the fact that many students did not benefit at all from

"incorrect work assignments." (CTK [Prague], July 28.)

Promising that better arrangements will be made in the future, Kristek admitted that the present practice of sending students into jobs for which they have no skills has not helped anyone. Several newspapers had previously criticized such programs because of their effect on production schedules and wage levels. Under the new plan students will receive practical experience "only in those specialized fields for which they are preparing themselves," according to the government spokesman.

Fierlinger Honored

Chairman of the National Assembly Zdenek Fierlinger celebrated his 70th birthday in July and was awarded special honors by the Czechoslovak government. Fierlinger had been the first Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia after the liberation, as well as head of the Social Democratic Party; in 1948 he led the remnants of his party into a merger with the Communists. Since 1954 he has been a member of the Politburo. The day after his birthday was announced, President Novotny awarded him, in recognition of his "loyal achievements," the Klement

Gottwald Order, "For the Building of the Socialist Motherland." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], July 12.)

1941 Treaty Celebrated

On July 18, the 20th anniversary of the signing of a treaty between the Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London and the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Vaclav David leaped over a few historical facts to congratulate and praise the Soviet Union for "making Czechoslovakia an equal member of the anti-Hitler coalition." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], July 18.)

Ignoring the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 which gave Soviet aid to the German war effort, expelled the Czechoslovak Minister in Moscow and brought Soviet recognition of the puppet Slovak state, the radio and press hailed the treaty of 1941 as "one of the most important documents in history." The propaganda dismissed Czechoslovakia's historical ties with the West, saying: "There will never again be another Munich or another March 15. The invincible might of the Soviet Union and the power of the whole socialist camp is also our power." (Radio Prague, July 18.)

HUNGARY

The Food Shortage

Faced with dwindling supplies of fresh produce, the Ministry of Domestic Trade has set price controls on the "free" market. A recent decree listed 19 fruits and vegetables—the principal ones purchased by the population—which private merchants may not sell at prices in excess of those prevailing in state and cooperative retail outlets. Unlisted produce may not be sold at more than 25 percent above purchase price, and the profit must include the shipping cost. (*Figyelő* [Budapest], July 12.)

The motives behind the move—which resembles the controls established in the early 1950s under Rakosi—are clear enough. Not only are meats, fruit and vegetables increasingly

short, but the prospects for improvement are dim. Things are not going at all well in the new collective farms, judging from what has been revealed in official press reports.

Only Apricots Available

The Party daily *Nepszabadság* (Budapest), July 9, gave the following account of the fruit and vegetable shortage:

"There is a shortage of kale and cauliflower, and no fruit—with the exception of apricots—is available. . . .

"According to the director of the Vegetable and Fruit Distributing Center, there has been a drop in the quantity of goods brought to the Budapest market in recent days. Only 50 percent of the required quantities of green



The movie-star quality of Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin is highlighted in this cartoon, comparing his smile with the Mona Lisa.

Nepszabadság (Budapest), July 23, 1961

beans and cucumbers arrived, and there is hardly any cauliflower and kale. . . . A few days ago fruit supplies began to show difficulties.

"Twenty wagons of fruit are needed, but only 12 are received. Half of this consists of apricots, the only fruit for which supplies are satisfactory. . . .

"It is obvious that the recent heat wave had a bad effect on vegetable and fruit yields. However, the drop in supply is not only due to unfavorable weather conditions. During the present period of peak work, little attention is being paid to picking fruit and vegetables. . . ."

The collectivized peasantry have also shown little interest in providing meat and grain to the state purchasing organs. (Animals delivered to the state for slaughter in the first half of this year were seven percent fewer than in the corresponding period last year, according to the Central Statistical Office.) The Party has appealed to the collectives to distribute only enough grain to the members out of this year's harvest to cover their minimum needs, and to sell the rest to the state; those farms which are not self-sufficient in grain are being told to surrender all their output to the state and to buy back the flour and bread as it is needed. However, many collectives are reportedly "speculating" with grain instead of signing contracts with the state: "Only the blind cannot see that the free market . . . is offering opportunity for speculation." (*Csongrád Megyei Hirlap*, July 4.)

Harvest Problems

The harvest was not going well either, despite a "nationwide move-

ment" to finish threshing by August 20. "After the rains, grain lying in the fields was not turned over to dry. Organizational and other mistakes caused the farmers to lose interest in their work."

These difficulties were ascribed by the official media to underutilized machinery, lack of cooperation, and other standard inefficiencies. The most frequently cited problem was a shortage of labor. "Collective farms should make use of any available industrial worker who may be vacationing in the countryside," argued Radio Budapest on July 13. Some of the collectives, in their quest for manpower, were said to have hired daily laborers from other villages, charging their wages to the land-rent of their members. (*Nepszava* [Budapest], July 19.) Thus they became "capitalistic exploitative enterprises." But the newspaper conceded that a problem existed: the young people "go and nag the council leaders daily for permits to leave the village."

Training Youth Leaders

Members of KISZ, the Hungarian Communist Youth League, have been busy organizing action groups, writing articles, debating, and combating juvenile delinquency by patrolling the streets and "turning in hooligans." The role of KISZ in the "socialist education of Hungarian youth" has long been recognized, and recently new measures were adopted to further the influence of the organization.

According to the press, new courses will be introduced in September at all teachers' colleges to train future leaders of the Youth League. The courses are to be compulsory for all students. Juniors must attend practical courses

conducted by schools, pioneer organizations, factories and youth organizations, must keep diaries and must write weekly themes on their observations. The new regulations also insist on "the importance of studying and applying the educational methods of the Soviet Komsomol, making use of their 40 years of practical knowledge for the benefit of the education of Hungarian youth." (*Magyar Ifjusag* [Budapest], July 15.)

Unofficial Attitudes on Berlin

A Budapest newspaper has published an exceptionally frank account of the ordinary Hungarian worker's refusal to identify himself with the Soviet Union's stand on Berlin. Written by Janos Fulop, the article described a questionnaire submitted to a group of factory workers who took the position that "once a war started over Berlin it would make little difference who was politically responsible and who fired the first shot." This attitude, the author implied, is widespread, even though it rarely finds expression in official news reports. (*Elet és Irodalom* [Budapest], July 15.)

Leftwing Disorders

An editorial in the July issue of *Partelet*, the Hungarian Communist Party magazine, indicates a persisting confusion and ferment in some segments of the Party over the "hard-hearted and high-handed methods of leftist dogmatists." Although the editorial referred to a particular county, its appearance in a national journal is an indication of its general importance.

Recalling some of the language of the Moscow conference last November, the article reaffirmed that dogmatism

and sectarianism might, under certain circumstances, constitute an even greater danger than the old menace of revisionism. The tone was similar to another attack on dogmatism published several months ago in *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, another Party theoretical journal. (See *East Europe*, February, p. 42.)

First among the sectarians to come under criticism were "older leftist comrades who have failed to keep abreast of events, distrust new theoretical and practical viewpoints, and openly describe the tenets of younger and politically more flexible Communists as revisionist." The editorial continued: "Many of them maintain that the Party line on the avoidability of war is also revisionist, refuse to tolerate criticism from the workers, and stand in the way of paying material incentives to agricultural workers and thereby oppose current Party policy."


The editorial was careful to add: "The majority of persons holding these views are not ill-willed. Their attitude is mainly due to ignorance and lack of information. We will protect the correct policy of the Party with arguments and conviction, for we have to ensure that our Party members master the teachings of the Marxist-Leninist classics in a creative manner."

Collectivization in Poland Predicted

A delegation of the Hungarian Council of Collective Farms visited Poland recently and sent home word that individual farming will not continue there, predicting that all-out collectivization will begin soon. *Nepszabadsag*'s correspondent, along for the trip, wrote on July 21, "It is quite evident that small farms will not prevail long in this country either. . . . Even though agriculture has developed, it has lagged behind industry. . . . Shortages of grain cause grave concern. . . . A real solution can only be brought about by unifying them."

Propaganda Goals Defined

Assessing its recent propaganda techniques, the Hungarian Party stressed that "Marxism-Leninism must be creative," and that old concepts



Best cure for the insomniac—reading the Hungarian press.

Nepszabadsag (Budapest), July 23, 1961

must give way to new. An article in the main Party newspaper stated: "In rural areas the development of a united socialist peasant class is the order of the day, and tasks involved in this regard can no longer be outlined on the basis of the triple Leninist slogan since this had been a slogan of a previous stage. Marxism is a living and pulsating doctrine, enriched by new experiences in social development. Those who only learn the formulas cannot apply Marxism in practice."

With respect to the future, the article continued: "Class warfare must be reassessed also. And in the future we must place more emphasis on transforming the mentality of the people. We must fight bourgeois morals, selfishness, materialism, hypocrisy and careerism, and strive to disseminate socialist patriotism on a higher level than in the past." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], July 13.)

Broadcasters Meet in Budapest

More than 80 representatives of 25 radio and television broadcasting stations from all over the world, including Africa and Latin America, convened in Budapest in mid-July to coordinate a series of programs designed "to fight against the cold war." According to the communique released to the press, the conference decided to sponsor a series of international festivals, "improve the quality of programming," and "develop the radio and television systems of Asian, African, and Latin American states and establish friendly relations with them." The conference announced that the radio and television networks of the Cuban and Mali Republics had joined the organization, and announced its unanimous decision to convene the 1962 session of the International Radio and Television Organization in Havana. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], July 14.)

Zoltan Tildy Dead

The death at 72 of Zoltan Tildy, one of Hungary's leading non-Communist politicians after World War II, was announced on August 3. The cause of his death was not given.

A Calvinist minister (he studied

theology in Budapest and at the Assembly College in Belfast), he entered politics in 1916 as a member of the Smallholders Party. In 1930 he founded the Independent Smallholders Party and was elected to parliament in 1935. During the war he was one of the leaders of Hungarian resistance against the Nazi occupation.

When the Hungarian Republic was proclaimed on February 1, 1946, Tildy, then acting as Prime Minister, became President. He held that position until 1948 when Communist Party chief Matyas Rakosi forced him to resign. After attempting unsuccessfully to flee to the West, Tildy was placed under house arrest until July

1956. In the weeks preceding the October Revolt he returned to the political scene. On October 27 Tildy was appointed Minister of State in the cabinet of Imre Nagy and was a member of the Revolutionary Cabinet until November 4, when the second military intervention of the Soviet Army crushed the Revolt.

Tildy was arrested the following May and sentenced in 1958 to six years in prison after having allegedly repented his role in the Revolt. In April 1959 the Hungarian News Agency announced that he had been released under an amnesty granted in view of his age and his public repentance.

THE LAND OF SMILES

This allegorical tale by Geza Hegedus is probably the most daring work of fiction to appear in the Hungarian press since 1956. Until now Hegedus was considered an author of minor importance, very much a regime writer and journalist. In 1951 and 1954 he was awarded high government decorations and has been a member of various educational advisory bodies close to the Communist Youth Movement. The symbolism of his tale, which we print with only minor deletions, is too transparent to need comment.

When my aircraft landed in the capital of this strange country I began to suspect something unusual. A delegation of about a hundred men and women, all rather big, round-faced and smiling, awaited me. "Please smile"—were the words of welcome addressed to me in unison by the crowd. . . .

"Down with the dyspeptics!"—I heard next.

Then a stout gentleman stepped forward and said: "We are very pleased, comrade, to welcome you here. We hope you will return from our cheerful country with favorable impressions, and that, as a person with the physique of a good-humored man, you will spread the news about our regime, the only blissful one in the world. Cheers, cheers!"

I read the following inscription on the walls of the houses: "Power is in laughter," "Down with Gloominess," "Thin people should tremble with fear."

At last my friend explained: "We have come to the conclusion that thin, brooding, unfriendly people are to be blamed for everything. A few years ago we formed the Serenity Party, headed by the Great Laughter. Our scientists established that the only cheerful persons are those with a tendency to put on weight, i.e., the viscerotonics. Our influence in parliament increased. Finally we took power and elected the Great Laughter as our master."

"Was the number of thin people in parliament so insignificant?"

"Many thin people voted for us in the hope that in due time they, too, would put on weight or that we would overlook their physique. Very few of the thin people were successful. People who are doomed to be thin because of a disposition inherited from their ancestors might eat lard by the spoon, but they will rarely turn into decent men. We are still engaged in exposing the pseudo-viscerotonics. Many of them,

BULGARIA

Relations with Greece Hit New Low

Never the best of friends, the Bulgarians and the Greeks are once again exchanging insults that now threaten to break diplomatic relations between the two countries. Press reports from both countries indicate that the détente welcomed by Athens in 1954 has now ended, not because of Bulgaria's failure to pay war reparations but because official Bulgarian policy has changed direction. (See *East Europe*, August, p. 44.)

The recent flare-up was touched off by Bulgarian Premier Anton Yugov, speaking at a reception at the Polish embassy in Sofia on July 22. In a long speech commemorating the Polish national holiday, Yugov found an opportunity to accuse the Greeks of stirring up trouble in the Balkans. He expressed "bewilderment" that there should be misunderstanding between Greece and Bulgaria, and continued:

"We do not understand the noise and hysteria that is now being generated on purpose in Greece, nor do we



A Bulgarian attack on Greek "cold war" propaganda. The Greek ice cream vendor is selling "imported cold ices."

Sturshel (Sofia), June 30, 1961

in order to receive a public job, stuff cushions under their clothes and walk around with blown-up faces. Others, however, unfriendly by nature, learn a few jokes and repeat these all the time. They soon expose themselves, i.e., if they kill a joke they become suspect. Employment in the public service is preceded by a medical examination to make sure that the candidate is likely to put on weight. For higher functions or university admission certified photos of parents and grandparents have to be produced to prove their viscerotonic constitution. These measures greatly improved public welfare. Thousands and thousands of thin people were dismissed from their jobs and replaced by decent fat people."

"What is the fate of the thin people?"

"We are humane," said my escort. "Yet there are exaggerating elements demanding that the thin people be destroyed or sent away for compulsory labor. They are extremists who as a new form of greeting would like to introduce the word 'laughter.' As you have noticed we greet each other with serenity, for our leader, the Great Laugher, does not wish everyone to laugh all the time; it is enough if people just smile. We are moderate and wish to liquidate the curse of mankind, i.e., the inferior constitution of unfriendly and thin men, in a human manner. These thin men too have a right to live as long as they refrain from vile actions. Naturally if their harmful characteristics, deriving from their constitution make themselves felt, e.g., if they grumble, look at the world with a sour face or make venomous remarks, the rigor of the law strikes them without mercy. However, if they try, in accordance with their limited capabilities, to acknowledge this cheerful world, so alien to them, with a smile, they are allowed to perform inferior work, naturally at lower wages than the superior viscerotonics. This is fair, for a thin person needs to eat less than a fat one."

Our car passed a public building. "This is our famous picture gallery," said the man next to me. "You have certainly heard of it. World-famous paintings have been collected here during the centuries. However, the former, cursed regime indiscriminately hung up masterpieces and paintings with a poisonous and harmful influence. We rearranged the pictures according to our own theory. The fat women of Rubens received the place of honor. The paintings of El Greco were burned. . . ."

Elet es Irodalom (Budapest), July 22, 1961

understand why the general staffs of the NATO countries are holding conferences and whom they want to frighten by such conferences. Of course we know that the Greek government needs something to distract the attention of the Greek people from the difficult internal situation and from the complicated problems the government is facing. Greek reactionary circles, including the ruling circles, are afraid of the truth and of the achievements of socialist Bulgaria. This is understandable. One must ask in whose interest is all this hysteria. What is going on in Greece can by no means be to the advantage of the Greek people." (*Rabotnicheskoe Delo* [Sofia], July 23.)

The Polish embassy incident was followed by a press campaign against both Greece and Turkey over the meeting of Greek and Turkish military chiefs with an American NATO general at Dede Agach, on the Greek-Turkish border. The Bulgarian radio announced:

"It is obvious that these Turkish and Greek army chiefs of staff under the chairmanship of a US general have not been busy over peaceful plans but have discussed questions and measures which are dangerous for the peace and safety of the Balkans. This is confirmed by the fact of direct preparations for further insolent provocations, frontier incidents and diversions directed against the People's Republic of Bulgaria." (*BTA* [Sofia], July 28.)

The strongest Greek comment on

these accusations appeared a few days later in the Athens conservative press, which made frequent reference to Bulgaria's \$45 million war debt provided for in Article 21 of the Greek-Bulgarian peace treaty.

"In 1954 relations were established with Bulgaria because the Bulgarians promised they would fulfill their obligations toward Greece. Since they have failed to keep their promises, there is no longer any reason for continuing relations. It is impossible to reach an understanding with Bulgaria where espionage schools for use against us are maintained and where exiled rebel-bandits have been moved up to our frontier. The best thing is to recall our charge d'affaires and ask Bulgaria to do the same with its representative." (*Ethnos* [Athens] July 31.)

Early in August the Bulgarians again took up the initiative in a memorandum to the Greek government which summarized an exchange of notes dating back to last May, none of which had appeared previously in the Bulgarian press. The memorandum made references to Bulgarian overtures of friendship, cultural and trade exchanges and countered the Greek demand for World War II reparations with Bulgarian claims for a financial settlement arising from population transfers after World War I. The note ended with the allegation that "Bulgaria is prepared in spite of all provocations to negotiate all difficulties." (BTA [Sofia], August 5.)

Algerian Communists in Sofia

Several weeks after a delegation of Algerian Communists headed by Larbi Bouhali visited Bulgaria, the Bulgarian press published an official government communique which announced that "both delegations exchanged opinions on questions of an international nature" and "agreed to support the policy of the USSR in liquidating colonialism." The report went on to state that "the Algerian people can always depend on the support of the Bulgarian people in their struggle for freedom and in the building of an independent Algeria" and that "the Bulgarian Communist Party supports the just position of the provisional government of the Algerian Republic

for the territorial integrity of Algeria." (*Rabotnicheskoye Delo* [Sofia], July 22.)

Compulsory Placement of Young Specialists

An urgent need for qualified specialists, working where the state wants them to work, underlies a new decree of the Ministerial Council which sets forth principles for the "distribution and placement of young technicians." According to the decree, students who have received scholarships or benefited from some form of state support for at least one year of their training will be "compelled to work at least two years, according to their specialization, where they have been sent to work." If they fail to comply with the order, or leave the job before completing their required service, the full amount of aid received from the state must be refunded "together with the legal interest."

Moreover, the peoples' councils, managers of enterprises, etc. must accept any young specialist who has been assigned to them, and they are forbidden to hire a specialist or qualified worker who has received an assignment elsewhere. (*Izvestia* [Sofia], July 11.)

Leaders at Varna

The Black Sea resort of Varna has become an increasingly popular vacation spot for Communist officials. In July it received two Czechoslovak leaders and a group of Soviet dignitaries, all accompanied by their wives.

The Soviet guests were Deputy Premier Aleksei Kosygin, Marshal Marvei Zakharov and Academician Piotr Pospelov. From Czechoslovakia came Premier Viliam Siroky and Slovak Party leader Karol Bacilek. They were received by Bulgarian Party chief Todor Zhivkov. The Bulgarian press and radio explained only that they had been invited to Varna by the Party Central Committee.

Sofia Limits Polish Visitors

Claiming that the vacation areas on the Black Sea coast are overcrowded, the Bulgarian embassy in Warsaw recently refused visas to a number of Polish tourists who had planned to make private trips to Bul-

garia. Tourists traveling with the official Polish travel agency, Orbis, may still enter Bulgaria since they follow fixed itineraries and rarely get a chance to go off on their own. Until the new regulation was introduced, thousands of Poles made trips to Bulgaria on the invitation of individual Bulgarian citizens which guaranteed them a visa and which also offered many Bulgarians the opportunity to buy a wide variety of Western goods available in Poland that were unavailable in Bulgaria. According to one source, the Bulgarian government has been concerned over the effects of these contacts on the people of Bulgaria, many of whom have been refused exit visas for vacation trips to Poland. (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* [Frankfurt], July 26.)

Soviet-Style Currency Reform Set

On the first of January 1962, all wages, prices, savings, etc. will be divided by ten, and in the three months that follow all currency in circulation will be exchanged for new currency at the rate of ten to one, in what appears to be a replica of the currency reform carried out in the Soviet Union at the beginning of this year. The reform was announced on July 18 at a special joint session of the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. Said to have been worked out "with the extraordinarily valuable assistance of Soviet experts," the change was ascribed to Bulgaria's "tremendous economic achievements." Premier Anton Yugov said that it represents a positive response "to the requirements of the new stage of economic development in our country." Great pains were taken to point out that the living standard of the populace would not be adversely affected:

"All prices and service rates, as well as all kinds of income and savings of the population, will be reduced 10 times. Therefore, in the future, citizens will be able to buy the same amount of goods with their income as before and will be able to make use of the same services as with the old price scale. . . . This is one of the important points in the decision . . . which must be widely and properly explained: it must be understood by each

worker, collective farm member, member of the intelligentsia, and all workers in our country." (Radio Sofia, July 19.)

The government has begun an intensive campaign of explanation in the press and radio. As *Rabotnicheskoye Delo* (Sofia) put it on July 20, "there must be a resolute struggle against any attempt to distort the true meaning of the reform and to spread panic among the people." The regime is evidently worried that the people will look upon the impending change as a repetition of 1952, when a currency reform mopped up the bulk of private savings and imposed a sharp increase in prices.

New Exchange Rate Pending

On the question of a new exchange rate between the *lev* and foreign currencies, Sofia seems to be taking the same tack that Moscow did previously. "For the present we do not propose a concrete change in the rate of exchange," said Yugov. "Work is being done in connection with this problem, serious research work is being carried out, and later on a decision will be made on this question." The Soviet Union delayed six months after announcing its currency reform before it established a new exchange rate with the dollar and increased the gold content of the ruble. When the announcement did come, the currency reform was played down in order to give the illusion that the ruble had become more valuable in terms of the dollar.

Whatever new rate of exchange the regime in Sofia may decide upon, it will not be of much significance under the current trading arrangements of the Soviet bloc. Trade is conducted bilaterally, using rubles as the means of accounting, and terms are negotiated on the basis of world prices in dollars.

Performers and the Party Line

Continuing its criticism of actors and singers who do not follow the Party line (see *East Europe* July 1959, p. 48, and May 1961, p. 42) the Bulgarian press has welcomed a new set of regulations for the entertainment industry. The rules are similar to

those issued in 1957, whose observance has been largely in the breach. They include: the requirement that all programs of orchestras, vocalists and actors must now have prior approval by the artistic council of the "Bureau Estrada" in Sofia. The Bu-

reau has also been given the right to assign and transfer performers from one location to another. Prior approval must also be sought for plays or songs in languages other than Bulgarian or Russian. (*Izvestia* [Sofia], July 11.)

BY BREAD ALONE

It comes as no surprise when a cabinet meeting is held in Romania to discuss problems of industrial production, agricultural output or the dearth of consumer goods. But on July 22, the Council of Ministers assembled to discuss the quality of bread. That day also marked the end of the first national competition, launched by Party chief Gheorghiu-Dej, for high-quality bread; the following excerpts from a Central Committee letter addressed to all the participants in the nationwide competition is an extraordinary document. It reads like a standard Communist appeal for higher production, but the phrases ordinarily used to call for more steel or tractors are here applied to . . . bread.

"Working with equipment at the prevailing technical level throughout the country . . . the bakers who took part in the competition consistently produced a bread with improved taste and aroma, pleasing to the eye, which enjoyed the approval of the consumer. The indexes of quality obtained during the competition were 15-20 percent higher than the average qualitative indexes currently obtained in production prior to competition. . . .

"The competition has shown that the real causes of bread being in many places unsuitable to the higher demands of the population must be sought not so much in the present technical level of our bread industry, not in the quality of the raw materials, but first and foremost in the fact that the central and local state organs did not supervise carefully this important field of activity, that they did not take early enough the organizational and economic measures needed to eliminate this lag, to remove all the deficiencies impeding the steady production throughout the country of good quality bread. . . .

"The Romanian Workers' Party Central Committee deems that this competition and the analysis of its results must be the beginning of a wide mass movement of workers in bakeries and flour mills to improve the quality of bread. . . . Civic control teams consisting of the most demanding citizens, empowered to check on the manufacture, transport and sale of bread, will be set up at the executive committees of regional and city people's councils, with the support of the trade unions and women's committees. . . . Party organs and organizations will have to analyze and control consistently the way in which bakeries and flour mills carry out the tasks arising from the Party and government decisions for the improvement of their activities. . . .

"You, the workers, technicians, engineers, and employees of the bread and flour industry—the people expect you to give them high quality bread that tastes good, is nourishing and satisfying in bulk, and comes in a wide assortment of types. You can do this!"

Scinteia (Bucharest), July 23, 1961

ROMANIA**Romanian Leaders in Moscow**

The visit of a large delegation of Romanian government and Party leaders to the Soviet Union at the end of July brought one of the most cordial welcomes ever given by Premier Khrushchev to his satellite colleagues. Entailing numerous speeches and public appearances, it was markedly different from the series of informal visits of satellite leaders in previous months, although the official press releases offered nothing more than the usual platitudes of "unity, friendship and indestructible fraternal ties between the Parties, governments and peoples of the two countries." (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], July 30.)

The delegation included President and Party First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej, Premier Maurer, Central Committee Secretary Ceausescu, propaganda chief and leading theorist Leonte Rautu, Deputy Premier and economic expert Alexandru Barladeanu, Foreign Minister Cornel Manescu and Romania's ambassador to Moscow Nicolae Guina.

New Price and Wage Concessions

As has been its custom for the past few years at about this time, the government has reduced prices on a number of goods and promised wage and salary increases over the coming year. While the increase in living standards should be considerable, the concessions are more modest than those extended in two previous years—a fact which conforms to the heavy investment burden which the entire country must shoulder if the directives of the 1960-65 Plan are to be carried out. Real incomes were said to have increased by 11 percent during 1960, as a result of earlier concessions, and the Six Year Plan promises a 40-45 percent rise in real incomes, or roughly 6 percent annually.

The price cuts, which became effective July 31, ranged from 13 to 40 percent. While a complete list of the items affected was not made available,

there were no foodstuffs among the products mentioned; the reductions seem to have been concentrated on high-priced industrial goods, such as consumer durables and clothing, some of which have been piling up on the shelves for lack of customers. Some electrical household appliances were reduced 15-40 percent, sewing machines 15 percent, suits and dresses and artificial yarns 15-20 percent, rubber-soled footwear 13 percent, linen cloth and ready-made linen clothing 16 percent, and office and school appliances 39 percent. Perhaps more significant was the 27 percent cut in charges for the private consumption of electric power for lighting and heating, effective August 25; charges for electrical installations were also reduced by 20 percent.

On the wage and salary end, the July 27 decree provided for a 10 percent increase for workers and administrative personnel between August 1961 and November 1962; salaries of specialized personnel such as teachers, medical workers, journalists, etc., are to be raised by 15 percent. The lowest-paid workers are to get the largest increases—a tendency of wage policy throughout the Soviet bloc. Increases will begin in the bakeries and mills in August, followed by the food industry in September, the clothing industry in October, textiles in November and engineering in December. Premiums, the decree said, will depend in the future to a larger extent than ever before on the quality of work performed.

Altogether these measures are expected to increase purchasing power by 400 million *lei* during the remainder of 1961; in 1962 the estimated increase in cash income will reach 2.5 billion *lei*, and in the following year, when the total effect has been registered, it will amount to 5 billion. These figures can be compared with the 6.7 billion *lei* in additional income which the population was said to have received as a result of the price cuts in August 1959 and July 1960, the wage and pension increase and the tax cut of August 1959, and the salary raise for technical personnel



Romanian beatniks with a penchant for rock-and-roll.
Urzica (Bucharest), June 30, 1961

in August 1960. (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], July 28.)

ALBANIA**Tirana's Double Diplomacy**

Albania's role in the Communist bloc continues to puzzle foreign observers. Although the Soviet bloc press has ignored them in the past month, the Albanians attended the Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow. They also received 60,000 tons of Canadian wheat that had been originally shipped to China.

A TASS communique of August 5 indicated that the Warsaw Pact meeting included all the First Secretaries of the Communist Party Central Committees, but no mention of Albanian leader Enver Hoxha was made, even in the Albanian press. Tirana merely announced on August 3, the day the conference began, that "the chief of the delegation of the Albanian Workers' Party that went to Moscow has issued the declaration of the Central Committee on the question of Germany."

Although the Albanians have not made specific reference to shipments

of grain from China, official confirmation of this has come from the Canadian Minister of Agriculture who announced that a 60,000-metric-ton shipment of Canadian wheat had been re-exported by famine-stricken China to Albania. This was taken by Western observers as further evidence that the Chinese have supplanted the Soviet Union as Albania's main external support.

However, the Albanian regime continues to claim good relations with the USSR. In August the Albanian-Soviet

Friendship Association met in Tirana, designated September as a special "Friendship Month" and issued a communique which effusively declared: "The Albanian people, educated by their Workers' Party and Comrade Enver Hoxha in the spirit of an unlimited love for the great Soviet Union to which they are united by an indestructible friendship, are proud of the space victory of the heroic Soviet people guided by the glorious CPSU founded by the great Lenin." (ATA, August 8.)

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KOCA POPOVIC



Yugoslav Review (Belgrade), June 1955

As Yugoslavia's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since 1953, Koca Popovic has justly earned the alliterative sobriquet: "Tito's trusted trouble-shooter." Since June he has been laying the groundwork for the Conference of Non-Aligned States which opens this month in Belgrade. In July he spent five days in Moscow where he discussed Soviet-Yugoslav relations with Foreign Minister Gromyko. His cordial reception by Premier Khrushchev indicates that his visit was a diplomatic success. Although he has been to the Soviet Union several times (he accompanied Tito in 1945 and Djilas in 1948), this visit marked the first time he had been honored as the senior member of an official Yugoslav delegation.

Popovic is perhaps better known by Western statesmen than by any of the satellite leaders. He has visited England several times and has traveled in Western Europe, the US and Latin America. In the past 10 years he has been instrumental in signing an arms agreement with the US (1951), in negotiating a Balkan agreement with Greece and Turkey (1953 and 1954) and in restoring better relations with Italy and Austria (1960). In 1953-55 Popovic also headed the Yugoslav delegation to the UN General Assembly. In Belgrade, however, he plays a much less conspicuous role, limiting his contacts with the foreign colony to official functions at which he is usually outranked by his Yugoslav colleagues. Although a member of the

120-man Central Committee since 1952, he holds no post on the Secretariat or Politburo where other more prominent Serbians of his age wield considerably more influence.

Born in Belgrade in 1908, the only son of a wealthy Serbian family, Popovic became a well-known figure in Belgrade society as a young man. He dabbled briefly in surrealist poetry as a student at the Sorbonne. He was handsome, rich, educated and well traveled. His political radicalism added to his charm, and was considered by his friends and many female admirers to be a natural youthful revolt against family tradition and background. Occasionally, however, he got in trouble with the law because of his Communist activities. In 1937 Popovic went to Spain to fight with the Republican Army, an experience that prepared him for Yugoslavia's own guerrilla war later, and which made him a member of the elite "Spanish nobility" of Communists in contemporary Belgrade.

When World War II broke out, Popovic became one of the organizers of the Serbian revolt. When the First Proletarian Brigade was organized early in 1942, Popovic was made its commander. He later became commander of the First Corps of the National Liberation Army, and in 1944 Tito made him Chief of the General Staff. After the war he continued his military career until his appointment to the Foreign Ministry in 1953. Shortly after Tito was ousted from the Cominform in 1948, Popovic contributed to the Moscow-Belgrade polemic by publishing his pamphlet "Revision of Marxism-Leninism on the Question of the Liberation War in Yugoslavia." While of little theoretical or literary value, the treatise (which has been translated into English) maintains that the Yugoslav war constituted a new and important contribution to the Marxist science of war which the Soviet Union refused to recognize.

Popovic was married after the war but has no children. His wife Lepa, who accompanied him to Moscow, is known to share his interest in politics and has worked as a teacher and in the Secretariat for Education and Culture. The couple are said to be fond of many outdoor sports.

MIDYEAR PLAN REPORTS

The pace of economic progress in Eastern Europe has decreased slightly in comparison with previous years, judging from the midyear plan fulfillment reports issued by the statistical offices from Sofia to Warsaw. However, all of the satellites allegedly surpassed the performance of their model, the Soviet Union.

Some had more trouble than others with the bottlenecks caused by insufficient fuel and raw material supplies. Achieving a balanced assortment of goods continued to plague the central planners. But the authorities have evidently had their hardest moments in trying to avoid inflationary pressures by keeping wages and prices adjusted to the level of available consumer supplies.

Behind the inflationary pressure, in large part, is the perennially delinquent agricultural sector; although the midyear reports preserved a studied reticence on this subject, they gave little reason for optimism. While the harvest is expected to be good in most places, work is proceeding behind schedule. The condition of meat supplies ranged from critical in Hungary and East Germany to somewhat better in Poland and the Soviet Union. Fruit and vegetables are not too plentiful.

Notable among the achievements claimed was a rise in labor productivity, a subject that has become increasingly topical recently in recognition of the fact that the Soviet bloc must learn to produce as efficiently as the West if "competitive coexistence" is to be a successful venture. In the Soviet Union, for example, the 8.4 percent increase in industrial output over the first half of last year was achieved despite a claimed reduction in hours of work per man. While output per man on an annual basis rose 3.5 percent, output per man-hour increased by 11 percent.

Hungary

Budapest recorded the highest rate of industrial growth in the Soviet bloc, 13 percent during the first six months of 1961 as compared with the same

period last year, and the half-year plan was exceeded by 4 percent. (The annual plan calls for an 8 percent increase in output.) An 8 percent increase in labor productivity was said to have accounted for two-thirds of the increase in industrial production, in contrast to the first half of 1960 when nearly half of the progress came from increases in the labor force. Employment in state-owned industry rose by 45,000 workers, or by about 4 percent.

The most dynamic industries were machine-building and chemicals. However, the progress of industry was said to have been spotty; a number of products fell short of target, while others were "erroneously overfulfilled" so that they "swelled already ample reserves and absorbed resources unnecessarily."

Not much was said about the agrarian sector, where the regime is looking forward to a substantial 7.9 percent increase in annual output despite the fact that planned investments in this sector are 27.1 percent lower than last year. By the end of June, 95 percent of the country's arable land was socialized, and 79 percent of this belonged to the collective farms. It was said that 57 percent of the harvest work would be done by machinery this year as against 48 percent last year. The grain harvest is expected to exceed planned targets; but work is proceeding behind schedule, and the sown area is less than last year. More significantly, it was said that "the country's long-standing worry, the lag of meat production, still exists" and that "during the first half of 1961 the state obtained 7 percent fewer animals for slaughtering than during the corresponding period last year."

Although total investment outlay was cut back by about 8 percent this year (only the industrial sector received an increase, 7.2 percent), the work is lagging: 53 percent of the investment projects were not ready at the appointed time, and funds needed to commission new capacity were said to have exceeded the planned outlay by 22.7 percent. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], July 18.)

Bulgaria

Bulgaria's industrial production rose by 11.9 percent during the first six months of the current year, and it overfulfilled the plan by 6.1 percent. Labor productivity improved by 7.4 percent, overshooting the target by 2.9 percent. The number of workers employed in industry, building and transport increased by 61,320. The output of key items increased by the following percentages: electric power 18, coal 7, steel 41, electric motors 38, radio sets 12, nitrogenous fertilizers 5, phosphorous fertilizer 45, sulfuric acid 62, cement 10, woolen fabrics (minus) 7, shoes and slippers (minus) 4.

Some enterprises, however, did not fulfill their targets—33 in Sofia alone—and the shortfalls were said to have cost the economy 3,000 tons of cast iron, more than 10,000 tons of steel, 6,300 tons of rolled metal and 162,000 tons of lead and zinc ore. The worst conditions prevailed in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy—branches of industry which have not been able to meet their goals very successfully recently—and the underlying difficulty was said to be flagging labor productivity. The capital investment plan again went underfulfilled, although outlays were 13.2 percent more than in the first half of 1960.

In socialized agriculture, cattle had increased by 13.4 percent, cows by 16.1 and sheep by 5.6 percent, but the stock of pigs and fowl had declined by 3.6 and 6.9 percent, respectively.

Retail trade overfulfilled its plan by 1.7 percent, and sales rose by 10.6 percent. Large increases in average money wages were also reported: in industry 8.3 percent, transportation 7.6 percent, and trade 16.8 percent. (*Rabotnicheskaya Delo* [Sofia], July 28.)

Poland

Aside from some trouble with inflationary pressures and imbalance in the home market, the Polish economy moved ahead without serious difficulty. In contrast to the other bloc countries, industrial output grew faster than in

1960, increasing by 11.4 percent and overfulfilling the plan by 2.7 percent. Labor productivity rose by 7.8 percent. The faster growing industries were machine-building, electrotechnical equipment and transport, all of which raised their production by about 19 percent over the first half of 1960. Production in the building materials industry expanded by 13 percent (cement by 18 percent), in metallurgy by 9 percent, fuel 3, textiles 8 and in foodstuffs by 9 percent.

In contrast to the financial discipline of last year, the authorities allowed a 4.9 percent rise in average gross money wages in the socialized economy and a 3.2 percent increase in employment in socialized industry. The resulting 10 percent expansion in the wage fund served to increase purchasing power faster than the supplies of consumer goods. Moreover, income earned by the peasantry from the sale of their produce to the state, increased by 14 percent. In consequence, the authorities have had to tighten down again. Investments in the socialized economy—not counting outlays to collective farms and housing cooperatives—increased by 14 percent in comparison with the first half of last year.

The performance of agriculture was, for the most part, said to be encouraging. Cattle herds increased by more than 5.5 percent compared with June of last year (young cattle by 18 percent), and the number of pigs rose by 8 per cent. Equally promising were the deliveries of meat (especially pork), milk and eggs to the state, all of which were said to be substantially above plan. Consonant with the improvement was a 37 percent increase in exports of agricultural produce.

The population—which recently hit 30 million—purchased through the channels of socialized retail trade about 18 per cent more than in the same period last year. In housing, 11.6 percent more dwelling rooms were constructed than in the first six months of 1960. Foreign trade turnover increased by 11.6 percent: the value of exports increased by 13.9 percent and of imports by 9.8 percent. (PAP [Warsaw], July 24.)

Czechoslovakia

The Central Statistical Office in

Prague reported a volume of gross industrial output 9.7 percent higher than in the first half of 1960 (the planned increase for the year is 9.3 percent). This represented a 0.4 percent overfulfillment of plan. Labor productivity rose by more than 5 percent on an annual basis, and, as in the Soviet Union, output per man-hour was still higher, 7.5 percent, because of the gradual reduction in the work week.

Chemical and heavy machine-building production led with 12.5 and 11.7 percent increases respectively; however, both fell considerably below the rate of growth obtained during the first half of last year. In metallurgy and mining, production increased by 9.8 percent, in the fuel industry by 5.5, in consumer goods by 8.6 and in the food industry by 6 percent.

Employment rose by 4.2 percent, and the "income of the populace" increased by 6.2 percent, the report said. Foreign trade turnover expanded by about 10.6 percent as compared with the volume of goods exchanged during the first half of 1960. (CTK [Prague], August 1.)

Criticisms of the economy during the first half of the year hit at the poor performance of the construction and transportation industries, as well as the inadequate supplies of coal and electric power. The metallurgical industry has also been scored, not only because of its inability to meet quality standards, but for its failure to produce the slated volume of goods. As a result, many machine-building enterprises were said to have been forced to change production schedules in order to avoid work stoppages from a shortage of raw materials. (Rude Pravo [Prague], July 14.)

As for agriculture, little information was available except that harvest work was again lagging seriously behind schedule. As in past years, worker and youth brigades are being brought in from the cities, along with soldiers, to help the collective farmers over the peak work period.

Albania

Tirana gave a surprisingly detailed report on its midyear achievements. Industrial output rose by 8.7 percent,

overfulfilling the plan by 6.3 percent. Enormous increases were claimed in the sphere of labor productivity, such as 82.3 percent in the iron industry, 67.4 percent in copper, 21.3 in glass and ceramics, 17.5 in petroleum, and 11.1 percent in the building materials industry.

Percentage increases in the output of specific key items were given as follows: electric power 23.6, crude oil 20.5, copper ore 21.7, iron ore 47.5, cement 39.3, bricks 43.1, cotton fabrics 4.4, woolen fabrics 4.8, shoes and sandals 25. (Radio Tirana, July 29.)

Soviet Union

Industrial production advanced 8.4 percent in the USSR, overfulfilling the plan by 2 percent. Individual branches increased their volume of output by the following percentages: machine-building and metal processing 16, chemicals 14, building materials 13, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy 10, fuel and power 7, food 6 and light industry 2.

The following percentage increases were given for specific items: pig iron 9, steel 9, rolled metal 8, steel pipe 10, iron ore 11, oil 13, gas 28, coal—including coking coal—(minus) 1, electric power 9, sulfuric acid 5, turbines 3, metalworking machines 7, metallurgical equipment 2, oil equipment 14, chemical equipment 13, automobiles 7, tractors 11, agricultural machinery 28, cement 12, bricks 4, cotton material (minus) 1, woolen materials 3, radio sets 3, television sets 17, bicycles and motorbikes 7, sausage products (minus) 6, whole milk 8. However, a number of items fell short of the planned goals: turbines, generators, oil and chemical equipment, cement, bricks, refrigerators and newsprint, for example.

Capital investment increased by 8 percent, but it was 11 percent short of fulfilling the plan during the first half of the year. The labor force increased by 4.2 million workers, and the average money wage rose by 4 percent. However, retail sales expanded by only 3.5 percent, falling short of the planned volume. Foreign trade volume increased by only 2 percent. (TASS [Moscow], July 18.)

Book Review

Ulbricht's Economy

THE STRUCTURE OF THE EAST GERMAN ECONOMY, by Wolfgang F. Stolper with the assistance of Karl W. Roskamp, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960, \$10.00.

ELIZABETH MARBURY BASS

IN VIEW OF the international importance of East Germany's economic maladies—notably the steady westward flight of skilled labor which has been a compelling factor in successive Berlin crises—it may seem surprising that this should be the first major study of East Germany's economic development to appear in English. The fact is, however, that the East German authorities, like other Communist governments, only began to publish statistical materials in quantity in 1956, and that official Communist versions of several crucial economic indicators remain virtually useless for meaningful economic analysis. The Western economist must therefore construct his own measures piecemeal, at great expense of time and energy. Professor Stolper's pioneer work, conducted under the auspices of the Center for International Studies at M.I.T., was begun in 1955 and completed in 1959. His study is based on detailed calculations for every major branch of the East German economy during 1950-58, in West German prices of 1936 and 1950, and following West German statistical practices. He has assembled these data into a set of Gross National Product and National Income accounts comparable to Western measures.

Inevitably much of the book, as the author notes, "hardly makes reading to keep one awake at night." Only

economists themselves engaged in grappling with Communist statistical materials are likely to burn the midnight oil over his meticulous descriptions of each procedure, even though the prose style is unusually good throughout. There is, however, a great deal which can be read with profit by the general reader interested in what ails East Germany or in the broader questions of planning and economic policy, or by anyone who wants to take up the popular sport of making East-West economic comparisons. This reviewer is especially grateful for the scholarly and lucid account, in the chapter titled "East German Methodology," of the statistical nightmares with which both Communist planners and those who study their activities have to contend. The discussion is addressed specifically to East Germany, but is generally applicable to all Soviet orbit countries and is helpful in understanding the data they publish on their economic progress and the past flaws and recent reforms in their planning techniques.

A Unique Comparison

Professor Stolper's work is also of special value as a study of Communist policy in an industrially advanced country. While the backwardness of European Russia in 1917 may have been somewhat exaggerated in Soviet propaganda, there is no doubt that the country as a whole was far behind Western Europe, as were all subsequent Communist acquisitions except East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Since much of communism's appeal is based on claims to a supe-

rior system of economic advance and on promises of greater welfare once sufficient progress has been made, it is interesting to see how Soviet-style central planning has worked in a country which was "long among the most highly developed regions of the earth."

Stolper also takes full advantage of the unique opportunity offered by the two Germans to compare the performance of a Communist with a non-Communist economy. International economic comparisons are usually difficult if not meaningless, and East-West comparisons, though growing in frequency, are limited in validity. Leaving aside such obvious conclusions as that Russians lead in rockets but lag in eggs, it is hard to draw firm conclusions as to the efficiency of central planning compared to various types of market economies. To cite Stolper, "any interpretation of the growth rates in the Soviet Union and in the United States is bedeviled by the fact that the Soviet Union started as a backward nation when the United States was already the most important industrial complex in the world." Alternatively, a comparison of the two at similar stages of development introduces the problem of nearly a century's difference in historical and technological development.

Stolper makes a strong case for straightforward comparisons between "East" and "West" Germany. Since his findings are quite negative for East Germany, and since the question of comparability is crucial to his calculations, his argument deserves outlining in some detail. The two parts


of Germany were historically one, and the populations share a common language and common traditions and tastes. Their prewar differences in economic structure were less a matter of levels of industrialization than of differences in natural resources. The highly developed industrial complex based on hard coal in the west had its counterpart in the industries of what is now called East Germany, where they were based on lignite and skilled labor.

Picture of Failure

Landholdings tended to be larger in central Germany than in the west, but the myth—fostered by the Communists—of a feudal agrarianism was true of only one locality. Employment in industry in 1939 was proportionately slightly higher in central Germany than in the western part of the country, and manufacturing had long been renowned for technical precision and skill. Thus, in East Germany we have a region whose "achievements and failures can reasonably be compared with the achievements and failures of advanced market economies." Wartime destruction, and the disruption of partition, probably affected both East and West Germany in roughly comparable degree. The differences in their postwar performances are thus attributable to different occupation policies, different internal policies, and different foreign economic orientations.

The question of the comparability of the two parts of the country is also basic to Stolper's calculations of East German production in West German prices. Here a brief technical word is in order because, to borrow his words again, "facts" in economics are only rarely so simple that it becomes unnecessary to know just how they were arrived at" and just how literally they are to be taken. This is especially true of indexes representing monetary values, because the rates of growth or decline they show can vary widely, depending on their price bases. The economist working on a Soviet-bloc country is invariably faced with a choice of two evils. He can use domestic Communist prices if he can obtain enough data, but these are no-

toriously inconsistent for all but the most recent years, and may even now fail to reflect real scarcities, costs, and demands. (Stolper cites the example of a copper mill whose output received a higher price per kilogram in ingot form than if processed further into wire, creating a situation in which the official value of the mill's output could decline even when production of the more highly fabricated items increased.) Alternately, the economist can apply a set of foreign prices which may reflect the quite different conditions of another country. Thus the many excellent studies on the USSR in years past have reached diverse findings measured in the rubles or dollars of diverse years—none of which assure quite the results that would be obtained if a sensible set of prices appropriate to Soviet conditions were available. It goes without saying that the considerable differences in the natural resource endowments of the two Germanys mean that West German prices are also far from the theoretical ideal for measuring East German performance. Products originally produced more cheaply, and therefore almost exclusively, in the western area, and whose production has since rapidly expanded under the autarkic policies pursued in East Germany after the partition, are likely to be underweighted; this may mean some understatement of over-all growth for East Germany. This is not, however, a criticism of Professor Stolper's choice, for West German prices were certainly the least inappropriate base available to him; the historical unity and high degree of similarity between the two areas brings West German prices closer to the ideal measure than, say US prices are for the USSR. Another possible point is that his "value-added" series in many instances do not actually represent current value added because, in the absence of adequate data, he was forced to apply prewar input cost ratios to all subsequent years. But this, as he himself points out, is tantamount to assuming that there was no technological progress and would tend rather to exaggerate the growth of net production in East Germany. In these instances, as in all others where



An East German propaganda chart on the growth of industrial production. W. Stolper's estimates, reviewed here, are much lower.
Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), July 23, 1961

choice arose, he has consistently bent over backwards to give East Germany the benefit of the doubt.

Nevertheless, his results present a picture of East German failures that is all the more impressive because it shows that the Ulbricht regime has failed in its own terms as well as in those of the West. We have come to expect that Communist central planning will yield remarkable performances in areas on which it concentrates: that its willingness to restrict consumption and to neglect agriculture and housing will allow a relatively high rate of investment and permit rapid industrial development, especially in the basic heavy and machinery industries. Yet Stolper and Roskamp find that "the East German economy has performed more poorly than the West German economy by whatever tests one wishes to apply." Industrial production as a whole has grown more slowly than in West Germany and even most of the major producers' goods industries, to which Communist planning normally tends



Stalinstadt in East Germany, a new "socialist" city built around a heavy industrial complex.

Svet v Obrazec (Prague), July 29, 1961

to sacrifice everything else, make a comparatively poor showing. Measured in 1936 prices, which yield higher rates for East Germany than the 1950-priced estimates, industrial output reached 127 percent of the 1936 level by 1955 and 141 percent of the 1936 level in 1957, while West Germany's index had risen to 198. The electric power industry, by 1955, had reached 193 percent of its 1936 output in contrast to 360 for West Germany, and an index of engineering industries touched 190 in 1958, as opposed to 244 for West Germany. Thus, compared to 1936, "The aggregate [industrial] showing of the Federal Republic was undoubtedly and spectacularly better."

When industrial growth rates since 1950 are compared they are more nearly alike, but West Germany still maintained a widening lead despite the fact that its production was already ten percent above prewar in 1950, while East German output is estimated to have reached only about three-quarters of the 1936 level at best in 1950. The only branches in

which East Germany ostensibly excels when the comparison is based on 1950 are, perhaps surprisingly, the food and manufactured consumer goods industries. Their growth, however, started from only 66 and 44 percent, respectively, of their 1936 levels in 1950, whereas their West German counterparts were already 8 and 14 percent above prewar. East German output of manufactured consumer goods, indeed, remained considerably below prewar through 1958. Stolper's estimates for that year give an index of barely 80 percent of 1936, which was itself a year when living standards in Germany were low.

Stagnant Agriculture

The comparatively poor performance in industry was more than matched by the stagnation, even decline, of agriculture. With a qualifying note on structural changes in East German agriculture toward greater livestock production, Professor Stolper states: "In spite of all the caution one may wish to exercise, the conclusion seems to be (to put it

mildly) that East German agricultural production has not been a success. . . . There is no evidence that agricultural production has increased since 1951 or 1952. The output of 1952 has not been reached in any subsequent year" [through 1958]. The value of East German agriculture's and forestry's net product remains below that of 1936 in all of Stolper's calculations, while in West Germany it has run around 20 percent above that prewar year since 1952.

And the list goes on, through the other economic branches, to a final comparison of Gross National Product: "When the East German GNP is calculated with the West German coverage . . . , the East German GNP in 1936 prices between 1936 and 1955 rose 10.4 percent, and from 1950 it rose 40.6 percent. The comparable West German GNP rose in the same time span 80.3 percent and 63.5 percent, respectively. . . . There can be little doubt that the over-all performance of the Federal Republic was substantially better, whether 1955 is compared with 1936 or with 1950. And once employment is taken into account, "without any intent to belittle what has been achieved in East Germany, it is a fact that both output per man and total output grew slightly faster in West Germany than in East Germany in spite of the higher level on which the increases in the West German GNP are based."

On the distribution of what is produced, Stolper's findings are not surprising when viewed in the light of traditional Communist policies — though it may be questioned whether the usual restrictions on consumption should, in Communist theory, have been necessary in an advanced country. He finds that "it took the East German economy the whole of the First Five Year Plan to reach a point where the share of consumption in GNP was at least of the same order of magnitude as the share which consumption has held throughout the postwar years in the Federal Republic. . . . Even in 1957, per capita consumption cannot have been back to the 1936 level in East Germany, while in the Federal Republic it was certainly already above it in 1952. All the substantial increases in per capita

consumption since . . . 1950 cannot hide the fact that even in 1955, at the end of the First Plan, per capita consumption in East Germany was only 60 percent of that in West Germany. Nor did the gap narrow in 1956 or 1957, although by 1958 the relative position of the average East German may have improved somewhat."

The People and the System

Stolper's findings on investment, however, are surprising, for we expect exceptionally high rates of investment under Communist policies. His results indicate that "gross fixed investment was undoubtedly a smaller portion of GNP from 1950 through 1952 or 1953 in East Germany than in the Federal Republic. By 1955 the ratios had become approximately the same; and by 1957, the East German ratios surpassed those of West Germany." Thus for about half of the period under review East Germany's rate of investment was lower than in the West, and this was an important cause of East Germany's lower growth rates.

East Germany's population and labor problems are a recurrent and vital theme in Stolper's book. I may, indeed, have done him an injustice in leaving this topic, to which he devoted his first two chapters, to the last. All per capita comparisons, of course, can only be fully appreciated in the light of the fact that East Germany's population declined by one million during 1950-8, while West Germany's increased by nearly five million. The more important consideration, however, is that this shift represents the loss of an important part of East Germany's labor force. The number who have left is actually higher than the net loss, because there has been a steady excess of births over deaths throughout the period. And they have been predominantly from the most productive age groups, including more men than women. Although the East German authorities have contrived to increase the quantity of people actually working, "the number of women, old people, and invalids forced into the production process must have increased . . .

Such a situation must be reflected in productivity and must be a drag on the fulfillment of the Plans."

The East German economy has, of course, had other major handicaps. To begin with, there was the USSR's vengeful occupation and reparations policy, which until 1953 amounted to "exploitation . . . as severe as could be designed and tolerated. Even with great sacrifices in standards of living," says Stolper, "investments remained low, and even if the planned economy had been faultlessly efficient, the reparations policies would have resulted in far less production than would otherwise have been attained." And planning was far from flawless: "The methods as well as some of the aims were undoubtedly inefficient even from the standpoint of the planned economy itself." The *Messwerte* or shadow price system used for planning during 1950-55 "made no sense even in its own terms" and tended to encourage misallocations of materials and effort. Emphasis on diversification and on large projects is now admitted officially to have been a costly error. East Germany was also warped into the autarkic pattern of "balanced" growth followed by all the East European countries in conjunction with the Soviet bloc's general failure to plan internationally until quite recently. Thus, "trade undoubtedly

remained less than it should have been and it certainly shifted from more to less efficiently produced goods." This, too, is now being corrected as the European Communist countries endeavor, through their Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), to elaborate a rational international division of effort.

Some of the drags on the East German economy in the past are thus being alleviated. Soviet exploitation has been reduced to a comparatively petty scale. The recent reforms in planning techniques and patterns will certainly diminish, though not cure, past inefficiencies while general East European economic integration will gradually allow East Germany more advantageous lines of development. It is Stolper's conclusion that "the economy will undoubtedly perform better in the future," and he has a further "chastening comment": "In spite of the undeniable shortcomings of the Communist East German system, it does show growth. The labor inputs are high, and people work longer hours than in West Germany and get less for their work; but, even where the Communist system is less rational and less efficient than the market economy, it seems that human effort, however extracted, can overcome the irrationality and inefficiency to a remarkable extent."

Other Recent Books

JEWS IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD,
by Randolph L. Braham, New York:
Twayne Publishers, 1961, 64 pp., \$3.00.

A bibliography, covering the years 1945-1960, of literature available in English.

UNFULFILLED PROMISES, by Alois Rozehnal, Rome, Italy: published in English by the Accademia Cristiana Cechoslovaca, 1960, 238 pp., \$3.50.

A carefully-documented study of social insurance programs in Czechoslovakia since the 1948 takeover by the Communist Party. Even specialists in welfare legislation, as Fr. John La Farge notes on the cover, have been misled by the seemingly generous coverage of Soviet bloc social insurance. Dr. Rozehnal reveals in this

valuable study the methods by which social insurance has been used as a political weapon in the class struggle. The conclusions he reaches regarding the Czechoslovak program are generally applicable to the other states in the East European Communist orbit.

COEXISTENCE: ECONOMIC CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE, by Henry G. Aubrey with the assistance of Joel Darmstadter, Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association, 1961, 323 pp., \$5.00.

This study is the conclusion of a special project of the National Planning Association devoted to The Economics of Competitive Coexistence. Seven country and area studies have been previously published, and this volume summarizes their findings.



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